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ABSTRACT—In recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has called 
on Congress to vest agencies with litigation “gatekeeper” authority across a 
range of regulatory areas, from civil rights and antitrust to financial and 
securities regulation. Agencies, it is said, can rationalize private 
enforcement regimes through the power to evaluate lawsuits on a case-by-
case basis, blocking bad cases, aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding 
private enforcement capacity in ways that conserve scarce public resources 
for other uses. Yet there exists strikingly little theory or evidence on how 
agency gatekeeper authority might work in practice. This Article begins to 
fill that gap by offering the first systematic study of an often invoked but 
little studied example: Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of qui tam 
litigation brought pursuant to the False Claims Act (FCA). Using an 
original dataset encompassing some 4000 qui tam lawsuits filed between 
1986 and 2011, this Article offers evidence on numerous issues that have 
occupied recent judicial, scholarly, and popular debate, including the extent 
to which DOJ utilizes its various oversight tools, the mix of factors that 
drives DOJ intervention decisions, and whether DOJ’s seemingly powerful 
impact on case outcomes can be ascribed to its merits-screening or merits-
making role. The analysis mostly rejects heated claims that DOJ 
decisionmaking has a partisan political cast or is unconnected to case merit. 
At the same time, however, it uncovers substantial evidence that DOJ 
makes case decisions strategically, separate and apart from pure merits 
considerations, in response to simple resource constraints, judicial threats 
to its ability to police collusive relator–defendant settlements, and the 
identity (and corporate power) of the defendant. These findings have 
important implications for judicial evaluation of qui tam suits as well as 
leading FCA reform proposals. More broadly, the analysis opens up new 
theoretical and empirical avenues for thinking about optimal regulatory 
design at the border of litigation and administration, with applications well 
beyond the FCA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial developments in the American 
regulatory state in recent decades is a marked shift away from 
administrative regulation and enforcement and toward private lawsuits as a 
regulatory tool.1 Champions of that trend assert that deputizing “private 
attorneys general” to enforce legal mandates taps private information, 
resources, and expertise while serving to check agency capture by regulated 
 
1 See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC 
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010). 
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parties.2 Critics counter that private enforcement yields wasteful and 
uncoordinated regulatory efforts and trenches on government enforcement 
prerogatives.3 From an institutional-design perspective, a core challenge is 
how to exploit private enforcement’s virtues while mitigating its vices.4 
More broadly, how can we achieve optimal coordination of public and 
private enforcement mechanisms? 
One way to rationalize private enforcement regimes, some contend, is 
to grant public agencies the power to oversee private litigation efforts.5 In 
particular, agencies might be given the authority to manage private 
enforcement efforts on a case-by-case basis, evaluating private lawsuits and 
either joining and co-prosecuting them or dismissing them outright.6 Armed 
with such authority, agencies can efficiently manage private enforcement 
capacity, delegating enforcement duties to capable and well-incentivized 
 
2 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding 
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95, 107 (2005). 
3 Id. at 114. 
4 See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam 
Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1253 (2012) (framing institutional-design challenge as 
“harnessing” in twin sense of leveraging and constraining). 
5 See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013) (offering a taxonomy of different types of agency gatekeeper proposals). 
6 Numerous commentators have advanced such proposals across a range of policy contexts, as to an 
already existing litigation regime or in combination with a proposal to grant individuals a private right 
of action to enforce legal mandates on the government’s behalf. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1517–18 (1996) (securities); 
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52–53, 72, 76 (2002) (environmental protection 
and securities); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 198–202 (securities); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural 
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1384, 1387–88, 1421–24 (2000) (civil rights); William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust 
Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 796 (2001) (antitrust); 
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 941 (2001) (antitrust); 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by 
Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 55 (2009–2010) (securities); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities 
Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 
10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (securities); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement 
of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1012–13 (2010) (securities); Bartonv H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 206, 233–
34 (environmental protection); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX 
LAW. 357 (2008) (tax); Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud 46 
(2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (securities). 
As I explain elsewhere, we might call this type of agency authority retail gatekeeper authority. As an 
alternative, agencies might be vested with wholesale gatekeeper authority in which they use their 
synoptic perspective to weigh costs and benefits and determine whether private rights of action should 
lie at all. See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 28–29 (coining the “wholesale” and “retail” terminology); see 
also Stephenson, supra note 2, at 95 (arguing that agencies should be given greater authority “to create 
and delimit private rights of action”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of 
Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1996) (same). 
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private enforcers and thus conserving scarce public resources for other 
uses.7 
But a long literature on public bureaucracies also suggests reason for 
caution. Given that private enforcement is designed at least in part to 
counter possible agency capture, bringing agencies back into the equation 
risks returning the fox to the henhouse. Calls for expanded agency 
oversight authority also raise concerns about the capacity and will of 
agencies to optimally perform gatekeeper duties, whether because of 
limited ability to gauge case merit, pursuit of political rewards, or imperfect 
managerial control over line-level personnel.8 
Despite growing debate around these issues, there exists strikingly 
little theory or evidence on how agency gatekeeper authority should or 
would work in practice. This Article begins to fill that gap by offering the 
first comprehensive study of an often invoked but little-studied example: 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of lawsuits brought 
pursuant to the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA). The 
FCA’s qui tam provisions empower private persons, dubbed “relators,” to 
sue private parties alleging fraud against the United States and earn a cash 
“bounty” equal to a portion of any proceeds returned to the federal 
treasury.9 The Act also grants DOJ expansive gatekeeper powers. Among 
other things, DOJ can intervene in qui tam lawsuits, taking primary control 
over their prosecution, or even dismiss them out from under private relators 
entirely.10 This unique public–private hybrid enforcement approach has 
become the gold standard among those who advocate a heightened agency 
oversight role across a range of litigation contexts, including civil rights,11 
environmental protection,12 and financial and securities regulation.13 None 
 
7 Cf. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 879 (1985) 
(proposing that the EPA “cede[] control over routine penalty actions to private enforcers, and 
concentrate[] its efforts on the novel, difficult and expensive areas of enforcement”); Wendy 
Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law, 68 LAND ECON. 
28, 46 (1992) (“The very existence of private enforcement allows the public sector greater flexibility in 
targeting its limited enforcement resources.”); Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private 
Participation in Regulating and Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen 
Involvement, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 469 (1999) (“By delegating to private citizens authority to 
perform certain tasks, . . . the EPA can relieve some of the burden on its dwindling budget thereby 
allowing it to concentrate on areas where its resources and expertise are more sorely needed.”); 
Stephenson, supra note 2, at 109 (noting that agencies can “economize” on scarce resources by 
selectively relying upon private enforcement where it makes sense to do so). 
8 For detailed theoretical discussion of each of these concerns, including the possibility of 
regulatory capture noted previously, see infra Part I.B. 
9 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006) (setting forth FCA’s qui tam provisions). 
10 See id. § 3730(c)(1)–(2) (vesting the government with these powers). 
11 See Gilles, supra note 6, at 1387–88. 
12 See Bucy, supra note 6, at 76; Thompson, supra note 6, at 233–34. 
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of these calls, however, is accompanied by more than superficial 
consideration of the merits or demerits of the FCA approach.14 
Even beyond its frequent invocation, the FCA’s qui tam regime is 
worthy of study. The regime is big and growing fast, producing nearly 
3000 lawsuits and roughly $12 billion in recoveries in the last five years 
alone—numbers that rival, and even eclipse, those achieved by private 
enforcement efforts in other, much-analyzed areas of law such as securities 
and antitrust over the same period.15 And qui tam’s explosive growth has 
stoked heated debate about DOJ’s discharge of its statutory gatekeeper 
duties in particular. 
One flashpoint is how to interpret the fact that most qui tam recoveries 
come where DOJ has intervened while most cases in which DOJ declines 
to intervene end in dismissal. Qui tam’s critics assert that declined cases 
should thus be presumed meritless and accuse DOJ of too meekly 
exercising its authority to terminate cases or argue that relators should be 
precluded from pursuing cases at all where DOJ refuses to become 
involved.16 Some federal courts adopt a similar view, explicitly inferring a 
 
13 See Bucy, supra note 6, at 76; Fisch, supra note 6, at 198–202; Rose, supra note 6; Arlen, supra 
note 6, at 2–4. 
14 For instance, Rose makes a thought-provoking, article-length call to vest the SEC with 
gatekeeper powers akin to what DOJ wields under the FCA, but devotes only a few pages to potential 
challenges to such an oversight regime. See Rose, supra note 6, at 1358–63; see also Bucy, supra note 
6, at 53–54 (offering a brief descriptive overview of qui tam filing and recovery trends as evidence that 
the FCA’s hybrid public–private enforcement approach has been “extraordinarily successful as a 
regulatory tool”); Gilles, supra note 6, at 1421–24 (concluding without substantial empirical or other 
analysis that the FCA’s hybrid public–private enforcement model is the “most effective” approach to 
deterring fraud). 
15 For the most up-to-date aggregated statistics on qui tam filings and recoveries, see Civil Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics—Overview: October 1, 1987–September 30, 2012 (Oct. 24, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf [hereinafter Fraud 
Statistics], which reported approximately $2.8 billion in qui tam recoveries in 2011 and $3.4 billion in 
2012, with more than 600 new filings in both years. For securities litigation statistics, see Ellen M. 
Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2012 Review and Analysis, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 2 (2013), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/
REVIEW_1995-2012/Settlements_Through_12_2012.pdf, which reported $2.9 billion in settlements in 
2012 and $1.4 billion in 2011, and Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action 
Filings: 2012 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 3 (2013), available at http://securities.
stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2012_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Securities_Class_Action_
Filings_2012_YIR.pdf, which reported 152 filings in 2012 and 188 filings in 2011. For antitrust filing 
statistics, see Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.41.2010, ST. U. N.Y.  
ALBANY (2010), http://sourcebook.mybigcommerce.com/sections/courts/antitrust-cases-filed-in-u-s-
district-courts-1975-2012/, which reported an average of roughly 650 private antitrust lawsuits in 2009 
and 2010. 
16 See Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the 
Civil False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 826 (2012) (“The immense disparity between 
recoveries in qui tam actions in which the Government intervened and those in which it did not suggests 
that most qui tam actions brought without government intervention assert meritless or frivolous 
claims.”). For other versions of this argument as well as the claim that DOJ too stingily uses its 
termination authority, see Christopher M. Alexion, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates: Controlling Qui 
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lack of case merit from DOJ declinations, with many more presumably 
making implicit judgments along those same lines.17 In stark contrast, qui 
 
Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 404 (2012); J. Randy Beck, 
The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 638–
40 (2000); William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in 
Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 238 (1998); William E. Kovacic, 
Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1799, 1849 (1996) [hereinafter Kovacic, Monitoring Devices]; Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral 
Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 334 (2007); and Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the 
Department of Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 
76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1256–58 (2008). 
17 See ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER 51 (2d ed. 2009) 
(“Unfortunately, a declination is often a death knell for the case, because many judges view it as a 
statement by the government on the merits even though it is not.”). Many court decisions imply a 
connection between DOJ case-election decisions and case merit. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jamison 
v. McKesson Corp., 649 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that DOJ decision to intervene as to 
seven defendants but not more than 400 others meant that the unintervened claims “presumably lacked 
merit”); United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 242 n.31 (1st Cir. 
2004) (noting that “the government’s decision not to intervene in the action also suggested that 
[relator’s] pleadings of fraud were potentially inadequate”); United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the United States had declined to intervene in the 
suit, . . . which could be interpreted . . . as substantially weakening [the] case”); Riley v. St. Luke’s 
Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 775 n.38 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[I]n cases . . . in which 
the government has declined to intervene, it is likely that that decision is not a result of limited 
resources, but instead because the government has decided for some reason that to pursue the claim is 
inappropriate.”); United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“[A] defendant’s reputation is protected to some degree when a meritless qui tam action is filed, 
because the public will know that the government had an opportunity to review the claims but elected 
not to pursue them.”); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Attorney General’s 
refusal ‘to enter the suit may be taken as tantamount to the consent of the District Attorney to dismiss 
the suit.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Laughlin v. Eicher, 56 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D.D.C. 1944))); 
United States ex rel. Fender v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2000) 
(“The decision by the Attorney General not to intervene in and conduct the lawsuit is tantamount to 
consent by the Attorney General to have the action dismissed.” (citing Minotti, 895 F.2d at 104)); 
United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 78 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (suggesting that “the 
reason the Government chose not to intervene in this matter is its recognition that Relator’s 
allegations . . . were a ‘stretch’ under the False Claims Act”); United States v. Fiske, 968 F. Supp. 1347, 
1350 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (“[T]he filing and service requirements protect defendants’ reputations to some 
degree by making public the United States’ decisions not to intervene and thereby flagging some 
meritless allegations.” (citing Pilon, 60 F.3d at 999)). 
Other courts take a more measured view and assume that intervention decisionmaking is driven by a 
range of factors, from bureaucratic resource constraints to a simple risk–benefit calculation. See, e.g., 
United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that Attorney General may choose not to intervene “for any number of reasons” and that “a 
decision not to intervene may not [necessarily be] an admission by the United States that it has suffered 
no injury in fact, but rather [the result of] a cost–benefit analysis” (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (noting that intervention decision was based on “cost–benefit analysis”); United States ex rel. 
Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (D.N.M. 2000) (noting that intervention decision 
may have been driven by a “lack of available Assistant United States Attorneys” or “respect for the skill 
of the relator’s attorneys”); United States ex rel. Roberts v. Lutheran Hosp., No. CIV. 1:97C–174, 1998 
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tam’s champions complain that DOJ intervention decisions border on 
random and assert that high success rates in intervened cases stem not from 
DOJ’s case-screening prowess but rather its litigation leverage, particularly 
its unique ability to threaten defendants with debarment from future 
government business (a “corporate death sentence” for many government 
contractors) in cases it joins.18 Some have also accused DOJ of shielding 
politically connected companies from FCA liability, particularly defense 
contractors accused of fraud in connection with controversial military 
ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.19 In short, while DOJ oversight plainly 
plays a critical role, it remains unclear whether the FCA’s hybrid public–
private enforcement structure should be seen as an exemplary design or a 
cautionary tale. 
 
WL 1753335, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 1998) (noting that “the government has limited resources to 
devote to FCA investigations”). 
18 See Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public Health and 
Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 241 
& n.27 (2006) (noting “corporate death sentence” of debarment for health care providers); Tara L. 
Ward, Note, Amending the Qui Tam Intervention Provisions: Setting Debar Higher?, 38 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 297, 302–04 (2008) (describing government’s debarment power under federal procurement 
regulations). 
19 See The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most 
Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patrick J. 
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“In light of the politicization of the Justice Department, 
many wonder whether it has resisted pursuing certain false claims cases for political reasons—most 
notably those involving contracting fraud related to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.”). DOJ Civil 
Division head Tony West seemed to imply a lack of prosecutorial vigor during the previous 
Administration in recent congressional testimony: “Using the False Claims Act, the Department is 
aggressively pursuing fraud in connection with the wars in Southwest Asia. Thus far, we have reached 
settlements in cases involving goods and services provided in connection with the war effort amounting 
to $77 million, and since January 2009, procurement fraud cases have accounted for approximately 
$645 million in recoveries—more than the Department’s procurement fraud recoveries in 2007 and 
2008 combined.” Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14–15 
(2010) [hereinafter Civil Division] (statement of Tony West, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice). It is also noteworthy that DOJ’s annual press release announcing its 2011 FCA 
case-outcome statistics made particular mention of DOJ’s enhanced efforts in war-related cases. See 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in 
Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-
1665.html. Newspaper accounts have sounded many of the same themes.  See Carrie Johnson, A 
Backlog of Cases Alleging Fraud, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at A1 (“Critics argue that the delays are at 
least partly the result of foot-dragging by Justice and the federal agencies whose position it represents, 
especially in the touchy area of suppliers that may have overbilled the government for equipment, food 
and other items used by troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.”); Yochi J. Dreazen, Lawyer Uses Civil War-
Era Law to Go After Firms for Corruption, but Administration Won’t Help, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, 
at B1 (quoting qui tam relator attorney as follows: “The Bush Administration has made a conscious 
decision to sweep the cases under the rug for as long as possible . . . . And the more bad news that 
comes out of Iraq, the more motivation they have to do so.”); Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Rebuffed Food-
Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2007, at A6 (noting allegation by qui tam relator attorney that DOJ 
“has turned down numerous Iraq fraud cases to protect the administration from political damage”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1696 
Using an original dataset encompassing more than 4000 qui tam cases 
filed since 1986, this Article moves beyond anecdote and begins the 
process of adjudicating competing claims about agency gatekeeping in 
general and DOJ’s qui tam oversight in particular. Deploying multiple 
identification strategies, I offer evidence on three issues that have occupied 
recent debate. First, my findings confirm that DOJ rarely uses its 
termination authority, raising questions about DOJ’s will or capacity to 
play a welfare-maximizing role. Second, I reject heated claims about DOJ 
politicization, finding what is at best only tentative evidence that DOJ 
oversight has a partisan political cast, whether in defense-procurement 
cases or otherwise. Third, I find that DOJ appears to have substantial 
merits-screening capacity, contrary to the view that DOJ intervention 
decisions are wholly arbitrary. At the same time, however, I uncover 
substantial evidence that DOJ makes intervention decisions strategically, 
separate and apart from pure “merits” considerations, in response to simple 
resource constraints, judicial threats to its ability to police collusive relator–
defendant settlements, and the identity (and corporate power) of the 
defendant. My analysis thus suggests that courts should exercise great 
caution in drawing merits-based inferences from DOJ declination decisions 
going forward. 
More broadly, anatomizing DOJ intervention decisions highlights 
underappreciated challenges in the optimal design of agency oversight 
mechanisms, with applications to the FCA context and beyond. As just one 
example, my twin findings that DOJ is resource-constrained yet 
substantially more likely to intervene in cases brought by more 
sophisticated, repeat plaintiffs’ counsel are striking, for they suggest a 
potentially perverse allocation of public enforcement resources. This is 
directly contrary to idealized models of hybrid public–private enforcement 
in which public enforcers optimally manage private enforcement capacity, 
delegating enforcement duties to competent and trustworthy private 
enforcers and thus freeing up scarce public resources for other purposes. 
My analysis suggests a reason: the FCA’s tiered bounty system, which pays 
successful relators a higher bounty in cases DOJ declines in order to 
encourage private enforcers to go it alone and serve an agency-forcing or 
anticapture role, may undermine optimal agency reliance on private 
enforcement by raising the “price” of delegation. The result is a basic 
institutional-design trade-off: a legislator cannot incentivize private 
enforcers to play an agency-forcing or anticapture role without distorting a 
good faith agency’s ability to efficiently deploy private enforcement 
capacity. In these and other ways, my analysis offers fresh perspective on 
some classic puzzles of administrative law, particularly how to design 
institutional structures that balance the need for administrative expertise 
and some measure of bureaucratic autonomy with the demands of 
democratic accountability. 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches an 
informal theory of the optimal agency oversight role and develops some 
testable hypotheses for likely deviations from that ideal. Part II provides a 
descriptive overview of the FCA’s unique public–private hybrid structure 
and summarizes a range of mostly anecdotal claims made about DOJ’s 
oversight role within the regime. Part III presents the data and empirical 
results. Part IV discusses some implications of my findings for proposals to 
amend the FCA, assesses proliferating calls to export the FCA’s unique 
public–private structure to other regulatory areas, and suggests ways to 
revitalize scholarly debate around the optimal structure of law enforcement 
at the border of administration and litigation. 
I. AGENCIES AS LITIGATION GATEKEEPERS:  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Ideal Gatekeeper Role 
Any attempt to construct a coherent analytical framework for 
evaluating agency gatekeeper authority must first specify how an ideal 
agency would use such powers. Put another way, if an ideal agency were 
vested with the power to control or terminate private litigation efforts, what 
core tasks would such an agency perform? The scholarly literature on 
private enforcement’s merits and demerits suggests at least five 
possibilities. 
First, an ideal gatekeeper agency will use its gatekeeper authority to 
quash or cabin what would otherwise be wasteful and inefficient private 
enforcement efforts. Because a private enforcer will enforce whenever the 
expected return exceeds her costs, she may do so even where the social 
cost of enforcement (e.g., the transaction costs consumed by both sides, 
including judicial resources) exceeds the social benefit.20 Put another way, 
private enforcers do not exercise prosecutorial discretion. Profit-motivated 
private enforcers may also seek to apply legal mandates in ways that go 
beyond legislative purposes21 or inefficiently piggyback on public 
enforcement efforts and one another.22 Finally, private enforcers may 
 
20 See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social 
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (modeling this dynamic). 
21 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 22 (noting ways in which the interstitial and incremental nature of 
private enforcement efforts can drive the elaboration of legal mandates in ways that frustrate democratic 
control efforts); see also Stephenson, supra note 2, at 119 (“As neither the citizens bringing private 
enforcement suits nor the judges who decide them are subject to electoral discipline, private 
enforcement may undermine a valuable democratic feature of American governance.”). 
22 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 16 (noting longstanding concern that private enforcers will 
“piggyback” on public enforcement initiatives or other private lawsuits in an effort to free ride on other 
litigants’ work or take advantage of any adverse judgments that result); see also Stephenson, supra note 
2, at 128 n.117 (citing long literature on “piggyback” actions); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class 
Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass 
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simply bring meritless claims, whether driven by irrational motives, 
mistaken evaluation of case merit, or a desire to extract settlements by 
threatening high discovery or other costs.23 Where such cases arise, an ideal 
gatekeeper agency will terminate private enforcement efforts before 
substantial costs have accrued or take over control of a case and steer it in 
more public-interested directions. 
A second core gatekeeper task is unique to the situation in which 
private enforcers are deputized to collect fines on the government’s behalf 
rather than damages: policing collusive settlements between private 
enforcers and regulatory targets. Private enforcement regimes typically pay 
private enforcers only a portion of any fines imposed as a way to reduce 
private enforcement activity to something approximating a socially optimal 
level. But doing so incentivizes private settlements for an amount greater 
than the bounty but less than the full fine.24 An ideal gatekeeper agency will 
thus step in and thwart collusive private settlements that threaten to dilute 
deterrence or are otherwise inconsistent with the government’s goals. 
The remaining gatekeeper tasks are more subtle. As just noted, an 
ideal public enforcer will simply terminate private enforcement efforts that 
lack merit or whose costs outweigh any benefits. But an agency gatekeeper 
can still play an epistemic, merits-screening role in borderline cases. By 
neither joining nor terminating a case whose social cost–benefit profile is 
ambiguous, an ideal agency will signal its skepticism to courts and 
highlight the need for careful judicial scrutiny and case development.25 
A final pair of ideal gatekeeper tasks entails leveraging deficient (but 
socially desirable) private enforcement efforts. In general, an ideal public 
enforcer will maximally rely on fully competent and well-incentivized 
 
Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2000) (noting concern about “coattail” actions and 
considering their possible efficiencies); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with the assistance of Dana 
Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 745, 763 (2003) 
(empirically testing claims about “overlap between private and SEC suits”); Thomas E. Kauper & 
Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and 
Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1202–08 (1986) (same, in antitrust 
context). 
23 See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997) 
(modeling incentive structures and informational challenges that yield frivolous lawsuits); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988) (same); Avery 
Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 
(1990) (same); see also Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2000) 
(arguing that “irrational plaintiffs” have a salutary effect because they counteract the repeat-play 
advantages that defendants enjoy in complex litigation regimes). 
24 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 24 (1975) (noting criticism that private enforcement “creates incentives for bribery and 
corruption because the gain to the enforcer from enforcement is generally less than the offender’s 
potential penalty”); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 105, 123 (1980) (noting same concern). 
25 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 39–40. 
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enforcers, freeing up scarce public resources for other uses. But private 
enforcement efforts may also prove deficient, typically for one of two 
reasons.26 
The first stems from failures in the market for the retention and 
referral of legal services. Of particular concern are so-called “queuing” 
effects in which the best qualified attorneys cherry-pick the highest 
yielding cases, thus matching the best lawyers to the cases to which they 
add the least value and leaving the remaining, more difficult cases to less 
skilled counsel.27 Further mismatches may occur where sophisticated 
plaintiffs’ counsel erroneously pass on a high quality case, leaving it to 
lower order counsel in the queue, and enforcement targets, with full 
information about the extent of illegality, respond by investing heavily in 
defense. A public enforcer focused on achieving optimal deterrence will 
compensate for the resulting “adversarial asymmetries” by joining and 
leveraging the enforcement capacities of overmatched private enforcers 
who cannot fully vindicate the public interest.28 
A second reason private enforcement may prove deficient is scaling 
problems. Because private enforcers will act only if the expected recovery 
exceeds expected costs, they may not initiate enforcement at all where the 
cost of doing so is high (e.g., where they suffer high psychic or other costs 
from taking action, such as reporting on colleagues or engaging in 
 
26 An implicit assumption in the discussion that follows is that counsel quality affects litigation 
outcomes, which is relatively uncontroversial in the scholarly literature. See Sean Farhang & Douglas 
M. Spencer, Economic Incentives for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation (Sept. 10, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1882245 (collecting literature); see also W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE 
OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 85, 91 (1972) (finding 
improved outcomes for individuals represented by more experienced counsel in juvenile proceedings); 
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of 
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (finding that public defenders 
achieve better outcomes for clients accused of murder than appointed counsel); Engstrom, supra note 4, 
at 1267 (finding substantial returns to specialization and experience among plaintiff-side counsel in qui 
tam litigation). But see D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in 
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 
2118, 2150 (2012) (finding no improvement in litigation outcomes for individuals who were offered 
and used representation from legal aid organizations in appeals of denials of unemployment benefits); 
id. at 2175–82 & 2175 n.154 (reviewing literature on the effect of legal representation in civil disputes 
and criticizing the methodology used therein). 
27 See Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 
363, 368 (1998) (noting how queuing effects ensure that “top contingent fee lawyers end up with 
portfolios of better cases”); John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private 
Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 280 (2007) 
(noting the “queuing effect” within referral networks that leaves the hardest cases to “the middle or 
lower ranks of lawyers,” with the result “that the best lawyers do not select the cases to which they 
might be able to add the most value”). 
28 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 18, 40. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1700 
“organizational dissent,”29 or where whistleblower protections are not 
perfectly binding), even if post-initiation enforcement costs are low and 
enforcement would improve social welfare.30 Scaling problems complicate 
optimal calibration at the high end of the harm spectrum as well: private 
enforcement may be deficient where the targeted harm—and, by extension, 
available fines or damages—exceeds the malefactor’s ability to pay31 or 
where well-resourced regulatory targets are able and willing to mount a 
vigorous defense.32 Here, the ideal agency gatekeeper role is to secure 
desired deterrence across the full spectrum of misconduct by committing to 
assist such claims, thus inducing reluctant private enforcers with privately 
held information about misconduct to come forward. 
B. Deviations from the Gatekeeper Ideal 
Table 1 corrals the above insights and characterizes the role of an 
optimal, welfare-maximizing public enforcer with respect to each of the 
five core gatekeeper tasks. As the rest of Table 1 reflects, however, there is 
also good reason to be skeptical about the willingness of public enforcers to 
optimally perform these tasks. Modern governance delegates enforcement 
authority to administrative agencies that may or may not share ideal 
policymaker goals. One possibility is deterrence-diluting corruption or 
agency capture by regulated interests.33 A subtly different but potentially 
more important insight is that a gatekeeper agency may allocate resources 
with an eye to collecting political rewards by emphasizing production of 
 
29 See generally Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping 
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 434, 461, 486–87 (2009) (coining the term “organizational dissent” 
and noting the high psycho-emotional cost of whistleblowing). 
30 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 15; see also Polinsky, supra note 24, at 119–20 (noting possible 
deficiency of private enforcement at low end of harm spectrum); David Kwok, Coordinated Private and 
Public Enforcement of Law: Deterrence Under Qui Tam 12 (Feb. 8, 2010) (unpublished  
manuscript), available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=
ALEA2010&paper_id=375 (same). 
31 See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 7, at 42 (“Civil sanctions have a serious defect when 
the assets of the firm are limited relative to its obligations.”); Polinsky, supra note 24, at 119 (noting 
superiority of public enforcement where defendants are judgment proof). 
32 See Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution of Antitrust in 
the United States, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 187, 202 (2012) (noting that “risk-averse plaintiffs 
with knowledge about illegal acts might be reluctant to file cases against resourceful enterprises”). 
33 In its standard form, capture theory predicts that certain groups will systematically win out over 
other groups in the regulatory process, either because they face more concentrated benefits or costs and 
so have greater incentive to invest in information or lobbying efforts, or because they can better solve 
the collective action problems that can stymie group-based political action. For recent and 
comprehensive treatments of the capture concept, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., forthcoming 2013), 
and STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008). 
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certain observable bureaucratic outputs over others.34 The result is three 
additional agency “types” beyond the optimal welfare-maximizer agency, 




34 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO 
IT 251–53 (2000) (noting agency tendency to pursue certain observable bureaucratic outputs over 
others). On political rewards more broadly, public choice scholars have long theorized that agencies 
will seek to maximize their budgets—a view sometimes dubbed the “self-aggrandizement” hypothesis. 
See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–42 (1971) 
(offering the classic account of this view); GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 134–
36, 167–70 (1987) (same); see also Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional 
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932–34 (2005) (offering an updated and more skeptical view). 
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For instance, Table 1’s rent-seeker agency will privilege total 
monetary recoveries over harder-to-measure and empirically contestable 
goals such as total illegal activity deterred or aggregate welfare gains.35 
This is problematic, for the gatekeeper decisions of an agency that seeks to 
maximize total recoveries will yield an overall enforcement strategy that is 
not substantially different from that of profit-seeking private enforcers left 
to their own devices.36 To that extent, a gatekeeper agency focused on 
maximizing recoveries may perpetrate, rather than mitigate, socially costly 
overdeterrence. 
Other possible agency maximands can yield even more substantial 
deviations from the gatekeeper ideal. A politicker agency will go a step 
further than a rent-seeker agency, maximizing recoveries in which public 
enforcers actively participate. The motive should be obvious: a press 
conference touting yet another agency win may be better than one 
announcing a mix of public and private successes, even where private 
enforcers do not need assistance and marginal public enforcement 
resources would be better spent elsewhere, producing either greater 
deterrence or a larger recovery pie. Finally, Table 1’s belt-notcher agency 
will maximize its win–loss ratio. It might do so because cherry-picking 
strong cases and creating a substantial spread between win rates in cases it 
joins and those it does not will confirm its pivotal role to political 
overseers.37  
 
35 See Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking 
Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116 (2002) (modeling public enforcement as an effort to 
maximally appropriate the rents of illegal conduct); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the SEC’s Bark 
Worse than Its Bite?, NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2012, at 10, 10 (noting tendency of SEC to curry favor with 
Congress by structuring enforcement activities with an eye to “obtaining greater aggregate penalties, in 
order to obtain a larger budget”); John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, 
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 3, 2012, at 23, 24 (“[T]he SEC needs to be able to use objective metrics to justify its 
request for budget increases. By bringing many actions and settling them cheaply, it can point to an 
increase in the aggregate penalties collected, even if the median penalty is at the same time 
decreasing.”); Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 646 (2010) (noting the tendency of internal and external 
evaluators of SEC performance to employ “readily available evaluative heuristics,” including a focus on 
“the number of cases brought by the Division, and, to a lesser extent, on the size of the fines collected 
by the SEC”). 
36 See Garoupa & Klerman, supra note 35, at 133–34 (comparing public and private enforcement 
mechanisms where government seeks to maximize fine revenue and arguing that enforcement outcomes 
and concomitant social welfare effects will not differ between the two except as to “very high” harm 
misconduct or where public enforcement is substantially more or less costly than private enforcement).  
37 For a recent and innovative argument that legislative oversight can lead to so-called 
“accountability pathologies,” see Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Accountability 
Pathologies in Public Law: Diagnosis and Treatment (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). A further analogy can be found in the economics literature on “high-powered incentives.” See 
Daron Acemoglu, Michael Kremer & Atif Mian, Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments, 24 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 273, 292, 297 (2007) (theorizing that “high-powered incentives” linked to 
performance can generate “unproductive signaling effort”). Agency use of a high win rate to keep 
political overseers at bay might also be consistent with the view of some political scientists that 
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To be sure, an agency might seek to maximize wins for other reasons. 
Among other things, an agency might consider a neutral sorting-and-
signaling role in which it focuses on case winnability to be most consistent 
with its statutory mandate or its self-perceived role in a system of separated 
powers. To that extent, it may not always be possible to distinguish a belt-
notcher agency from an ideal, welfare-maximizing agency that sees itself as 
a merits-signaling adjudicatory adjunct to the courts. And yet, maximizing 
an agency’s win rate may not be the socially optimal approach. Easier-to-
win cases might be systematically smaller than more difficult cases if case 
size correlates with complexity or defense-side deployment of resources.38 
A win-maximizing agency might thus unduly focus scarce agency 
resources on low-harm cases, leaving more consequential misconduct 
undeterred.39 
More broadly, none of Table 1’s alternative agency types will 
optimally terminate inefficient private enforcement efforts. One reason is 
that each agency type can be expected to privilege affirmative enforcement 
successes over passive case termination, particularly where termination 
costs, both actual and reputational, can be reliably shifted to the judiciary.40 
 
agencies may adopt a position of “strategic neutrality,” deploying relatively objective decisionmaking 
criteria (here, case winnability) to avoid taking political heat for their enforcement approach. See, e.g., 
GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY: INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN 
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY (2007) (finding substantial evidence for this 
general proposition in OSHA inspection and enforcement patterns). 
38 See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN 
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 5, 7 (2010) (finding relationship between case “stakes” and 
plaintiff- and defendant-side litigation costs); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation 
Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 330, 353 (2007) (offering evidence that 
litigation costs tend to rise with case stakes and complexity); Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement of 
Law, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 60, 81 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2d ed. 2009) (“Even without regulatory 
capture, economizing practices by public enforcers reveal the presence of incentives to divert resources to 
actions against firms less likely to be able to defend themselves.”). 
39 See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement 
Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 725 (2012) (finding that the SEC pursued smaller cases in 
the area of broker-dealer regulation); Cox & Thomas, supra note 22, at 764, 777 (finding that the SEC 
brought more enforcement actions against smaller firms than did private enforcers where there was no 
parallel SEC action). 
40 See Matthew, supra note 16, at 300 (noting a similar dynamic). Part of this is a continuation of 
the logic of a self-aggrandizing agency: a politically conscious gatekeeper agency focused on 
maintaining access to needed resources will not steer its efforts toward purely reactive case terminations 
in preference to the pursuit of objective and observable measures of enforcement success. Moreover, 
agencies, in addition to being “self-aggrandizing,” are also often excessively cautious regarding risks 
within their regulatory bailiwicks and are thus just as likely to be “defensive” and “scandal-
minimizing.” James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 377–
78 (James. Q. Wilson ed., 1980); see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986) (“[R]egulation tends to be 
excessively cautious (forcing investments in risk reduction far in excess of the value that individuals 
place on avoiding the risks involved).”); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 370–71 (2003) 
(summarizing the literature on “[t]he risk-avoiding bureaucrat”). A useful analogy here is the “bailout 
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Worse, politically conscious agencies may in fact aid inefficient private 
enforcement efforts, since even socially costly enforcement efforts will add 
to recovery tallies or the agency’s win rate. Nor are such agencies likely to 
engage in systematic efforts to leverage deficient private enforcement or 
police collusive settlements except where doing so serves the agency’s own 
instrumental goals. 
Beyond Table 1, agency gatekeeping may deviate from the ideal not 
because agencies lack the will to optimally perform oversight tasks but 
because they lack the capacity to do so. One possibility is that an agency 
vested with gatekeeper authority will simply be unable to accurately gauge 
case merits, or do so any more quickly or cheaply than courts.41 Another 
possibility is imperfect managerial control: careerist line-level prosecutors 
who perform screening tasks may bias agency decisions toward larger and 
more consequential cases, smaller and potentially more winnable cases, or 
cases brought by more sophisticated private enforcers deemed to be better 
litigation partners, all in search of résumé-burnishing successes.42 
A final capacity-related problem is that even a good faith agency may 
not be able to solve the commitment problem inherent in leveraging efforts. 
Recall that an important part of an agency’s leveraging task is to induce 
reluctant private enforcers to come forward with socially beneficial claims 
they would not bring on their own by committing to support those claims, 
 
effect” that legal scholars and political scientists have noted in the context of judicial review. See Justin 
Fox & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing, 105 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 397, 397 (2011) (describing a “bailout effect” in which “judicial review may rescue elected 
officials from the consequences of ill-advised policies”); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–58 (1999) (arguing that “judicial overhang” can distort 
legislative behavior); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 261 (2006) (offering a similar account that likens judicial review 
to an “insurance policy against erroneous legislative determinations,” thus creating a moral hazard 
problem for legislative behavior). Another analogy is found in the classic concern that public regulators 
are systematically biased against the more tangible harms that flow from Type II errors (i.e., “false 
negatives” in the form of an erroneous conclusion that a dangerous product is safe) and in favor of less 
observable Type I errors (i.e., “false positives” in the form of an erroneous conclusion that a safe 
product is dangerous). See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 358–60 (2009) (summarizing the literature). 
41 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 41–49 (noting the inherently comparative nature of any inquiry 
regarding the competence or capacity of agencies to perform gatekeeper tasks and questioning whether 
agencies can gauge case merits any more accurately or efficiently than courts can). 
42  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in 
a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1106, 1115–16 (1995) (noting “the unique 
difficulties associated with monitoring the behavior of government lawyers”); see also R. Preston 
McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic 
Analysis, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1863, 1872 (2008) (“[S]ome government actors are likely to be partly 
motivated by factors other than efficiency, including career concerns . . . .”); id. (“In reality, the 
government’s lawyers may have incentives to win (big) cases independent of their actual welfare 
consequences.”); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing 
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1444–45 (1998) (noting tendency of civil rights prosecutors 
to bring relatively small and politically uncontroversial cases).   
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thus ensuring enforcement efforts across the full spectrum of misconduct.43 
However, because public enforcers may not be able to credibly commit to 
joining those efforts in the face of other enforcement opportunities, there is 
a potential holdup problem: private enforcers rightly worried about being 
left holding the bag will not surface the claims in the first place.44 
 
 * * * 
 
The goal up to this point has been to fix ideas and generate testable 
predictions about agency behavior. The resulting analysis has necessarily 
traded in stylized types. In reality, a gatekeeper agency, particularly one 
facing resource constraints, will likely pursue multiple objective functions 
simultaneously, maximizing a weighted mix of total recoveries, public 
recoveries, and its win rate. Note as well the uneasy relationship between 
leveraging efforts and other core gatekeeper tasks. An enforcement agency 
that seeks to husband private enforcement capacity by fully delegating 
enforcement authority to competent private enforcers and leveraging the 
litigation efforts of less competent ones risks muddying its merits signal 
unless it has a way to distinguish for courts cases it has deliberately left to 
private enforcers and cases of uncertain quality. Likewise, a merits-
signaling agency must exercise its power to terminate truly meritless cases 
or it risks sending a noisy or even illegible signal about case quality 
regarding the rest. Future research—including more formal work—might 
consider these and other possibilities. 
II. THE CASE OF QUI TAM AND THE PUZZLE OF DOJ OVERSIGHT 
The False Claims Act (FCA)45 is both an exemplar of the coordination 
challenges in hybrid public–private enforcement regimes and a natural 
laboratory to test Part I’s theoretical predictions. But it is also byzantine in 
its design. This Part lays the foundation for Part III’s empirical analysis by 
offering a brief overview of the FCA’s public–private hybrid structure and 
summarizing anecdotal claims made about DOJ’s discharge of its statutory 
oversight duties in particular. 
A. Qui Tam Basics 
Though enacted during the Civil War, the FCA’s modern incarnation 
dates to 1986 when Congress, faced with rising concern about defense-
procurement fraud, passed strengthening amendments.46 Since then, the 
 
43 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
44 See Ben Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False Claims 
Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135, 150–53 (2006) (offering a game-theoretic model of this dynamic).  
45 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006). 
46 See Beck, supra note 16, at 561–62 (recounting the FCA’s “1986 [r]evival”). 
107:1689 (2013) Public Regulation of Private Enforcement 
1707 
FCA has quickly become the government’s chief weapon against fraud in 
connection with federal programs and expenditures.47 Penalties are steep, 
including civil penalties of $5500 to $11,000 for each “false claim” made 
to the government as well as treble the amount of any proven fraud.48 
While the FCA empowers the United States to bring enforcement 
actions, the far more common mode of enforcement is private lawsuits 
initiated under the FCA’s qui tam provisions.49 These provisions authorize 
private persons, dubbed “relators,” to sue private parties alleging fraud 
against the United States and earn a cash bounty equal to a portion—
ranging from 15% to 30%—of any recovery.50  
 
47 CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 1.1 (2d ed. 
2010). 
48 § 3729(a) (setting range of penalty amounts). 
49 See id. § 3730 (setting forth FCA’s qui tam provisions); Fraud Statistics, supra note 15 (reporting 
more than 600 qui tam suits in 2011 and 2012, but only 124 and 135 government-initiated “non qui tam” 
new matters under the FCA for those same years). 
50 See § 3730(b)–(d) (outlining relator rights and bounty shares). 
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As shown in Figure 1, qui tam litigation has grown rapidly since the 
FCA’s revival, rising from 30 lawsuits in 1987 to more than 600 per year in 
2011 and 2012.51 Monetary recoveries have grown just as quickly, from 
negligible amounts at the dawn of the regime to a whopping $3.4 billion in 
2012, a sum that rivals or exceeds private litigation efforts in the antitrust 
and securities areas.52 Rising recoveries have in turn attracted a dizzying 
array of claims. The most common qui tam complaints assert fraud in 
connection with federally funded health care services under Medicare and 
Medicaid and defense procurement.53 Other types of claims include 
underpayment of oil and gas royalties for extraction from federal lands as 
well as myriad frauds in connection with federally insured education and 
housing loans, federally funded research and construction projects, 
Hurricane Katrina relief, and the Troubled Asset Relief Program.54 
 
51 These numbers, and the data presented in Figure 1 more generally, are taken from DOJ’s most 
recent figures on qui tam filings and recoveries, after adjustment for inflation. See Fraud Statistics, 
supra note 15. 
52 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
53 See Fraud Statistics, supra note 15 (reporting that roughly one-half to two-thirds of qui tam 
filings over the past decade concern health care fraud). 
54 For a comprehensive overview of claim types, see Common Types of Qui Tam Cases, PHILLIPS & 
COHEN LLP, http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/Common-Types-of-Qui-Tam-Cases/ (last visited July 
22, 2013). 
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Not anyone can initiate a qui tam suit. The FCA contains several 
provisions designed to minimize wasteful private enforcement efforts, 
including: (i) a “first-to-file” provision precluding claims that mirror a 
previously filed qui tam suit;55 (ii) a bar on claims related to an already 
existing government enforcement proceeding;56 and (iii) a bar on claims 
that were previously “publicly disclosed” except where the relator is an 
“original source”—that is, has direct, firsthand knowledge—of the 
information underlying the fraud claim.57 Together, these provisions are 
designed, as the Supreme Court has noted, to achieve “the golden mean 
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders . . . and 
discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant 
information to contribute of their own.”58 
A final set of FCA provisions vests the Attorney General—and, by 
further delegation, DOJ’s Civil Fraud Division—with substantial authority 
 
55 See § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other than 
the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action.”). 
56 See id. § 3730(e)(3) (barring actions “based upon allegations or transactions which are the 
subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is 
already a party”). 
57 For the currently operative language in the FCA regarding the public disclosure and original 
source jurisdictional bars, see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)), which mandates that “[t]he 
court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if 
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly 
disclosed—(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its 
agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, 
hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the action is brought by the 
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” What 
constitutes a “public disclosure” and an “original source” within the meaning of this provision (as well 
as its predecessor version) has generated significant judicial debate. See, e.g., Schindler Elevator Corp. 
v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2011) (holding that responses to a Freedom of 
Information Act request, and the records attached thereto, constitute a “public disclosure” within the 
FCA’s meaning); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 471, 475–76 (2007) (holding qui 
tam relator must, to satisfy FCA’s “original source” requirement, possess sufficient firsthand 
knowledge of information underlying fraud claim at time of filing complaint). Recent amendments 
made in connection with the PPACA altered the regime in two ways. See Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. at 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). First, the PPACA added the above phrase “unless opposed by the Government,” thus depriving 
defendants of the ability to independently challenge a relator’s claim on public disclosure or original 
source grounds by vesting the government with what amounts to a right to veto a court’s dismissal on 
such grounds. See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1250–51, 1251 n.18. Second, the PPACA clarified that a 
relator may qualify as an original source if she “materially adds” to publicly disclosed allegations, thus 
permitting relators to bring FCA claims with only secondhand information so long as they received that 
information from sources separate from any public disclosure. See Elameto, supra note 16, at 821. 
58 See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 
1396, 1406 (2010) (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 
649 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
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to oversee and control qui tam litigation. For instance, DOJ may dismiss or 
settle a qui tam case out from under a private relator, subject only to a basic 
fairness hearing,59 or veto private dismissals or settlements.60 This latter 
power is critically important: because a relator stands in the shoes of the 
United States and sues on its behalf, any judgment will have preclusive 
effect on the government’s later assertion of transactionally related claims, 
creating incentives for relators and defendants to trade an unduly wide 
release of liability for a larger settlement pot.61 Such concerns are 
especially pronounced in qui tam cases litigated within the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which has held—contrary to all 
other circuits to consider the issue—that DOJ does not possess an absolute 
settlement veto unless it has previously intervened.62 I exploit the Ninth 
Circuit’s unique holding in the empirical analysis to come. 
 
59 See § 3730(c)(2)(B) (“The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding 
the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the 
proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”). Note that some 
courts have interpreted DOJ’s termination and settlement authority as something less than absolute. The 
Ninth Circuit, for instance, requires that DOJ show a “rational relation” between dismissal and a valid 
government purpose. See United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 
F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A two step analysis applies here to test the justification for dismissal: 
(1) identification of a valid government purpose; and (2) a rational relation between dismissal and 
accomplishment of the purpose.” (quoting United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing 
House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1341 (E.D. Cal. 1995))). However, this is a low bar, akin to arbitrary 
and capricious review under the APA. 
60 See § 3730(b)(1) (“The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give 
written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”). 
61 See, e.g., Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the 
“danger that a relator can boost the value of settlement by bargaining away claims on behalf of the 
United States”). DOJ’s settlement–veto authority is also important where a relator asserts both FCA and 
other, often employment-related claims (e.g., wrongful termination) because of incentives to shift 
settlement proceeds away from FCA fraud claims, where a relator receives only a portion of the 
winnings under the FCA’s bounty provisions, and toward the other claims, where recovery is dollar-for-
dollar. Id. at 159 (noting the concern that a relator could “short-chang[e] the government by settling 
both a False Claims Act suit and a private wrongful termination suit at the same time and shifting most 
of the recovery into the wrongful termination settlement in order to reduce the percentage of the overall 
amount that would ordinarily go to the government”). 
62 See United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that DOJ may only seek to halt a private settlement by showing “good cause” where it has not 
intervened previously). Other circuit courts have come out the other way. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Schweizer v. Océ N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that DOJ 
dismissal or settlement authority is conditional on prior intervention); Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 
F.3d 925, 931 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Even where the Government has declined to intervene, relators are 
required to obtain government approval prior to entering a settlement or voluntarily dismissing the 
action.”); United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
“a relator may not seek voluntary dismissal of any qui tam action without the Attorney General’s 
consent”); Searcy, 117 F.3d at 158, 160 (finding “absolute veto power over voluntary settlements in qui 
tam False Claims Act suits”). DOJ has publicly chafed at the Ninth Circuit’s restriction on its authority. 
See False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4563 Before the Subcomm. on 
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Perhaps the most significant form of oversight authority is DOJ’s 
ability to intervene in qui tam suits.63 By statute, a qui tam relator files her 
complaint with the court under seal, serving it only on the government.64 A 
statutory sixty-day period (often subject to extensions65) follows, during 
which DOJ investigates the allegations and decides whether to terminate or 
settle the case out from under the relator, intervene and take “primary 
responsibility” for the litigation of the case, or decline to intervene and 
allow the relator to proceed alone.66 Importantly, the amount of the bounty 
paid to a successful relator turns, at least in part, on DOJ’s case-election 
decision: where DOJ declines intervention, a successful relator earns 25% 
to 30% of any recovery; if DOJ intervenes, a relator keeps only 15% to 
25%.67 During legislative debates leading up to the FCA’s 1986 revival, 
this tiered system of payoffs was seen as essential to incentivize relators to 
go it alone where a politicized bureaucracy refused to enforce.68 
 
Admin. Law & Governmental Relations. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 29 (1992) 
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice). 
63 See § 3730(c)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary 
responsibility for prosecuting the action . . . . ”); id. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (authorizing the court to “impose 
limitations on [a relator’s] participation” upon a government showing that “unrestricted participation 
during the course of the litigation . . . would interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s 
prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment”). 
64 Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
65 Id. § 3730(b)(3) (“The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of 
the time during which the complaint remains under seal . . . . ”). 
66 Id. § 3730(b)(2) (“The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 
days after it receives . . . the complaint . . . .”); id. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (authorizing the court to “impose 
limitations on [a relator’s] participation” upon a government showing that “unrestricted participation 
during the course of the litigation . . . would interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s 
prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment”); id. 
§ 3730(c)(1) (noting that government has “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action” where it 
elects to intervene); id. § 3730(c)(3) (“If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the 
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”). 
67 See id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
68 See Beck, supra note 16, at 563–64 (noting congressional concern during debate surrounding the 
1986 amendments that “political considerations” led to “prosecutorial timidity” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 
174 (1986) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (noting that because of institutional and practical 
constraints, DOJ is unable to bring cases for every act of fraud and “qui tam offers a real potential . . . to 
provide that prodding, that nudging, that will get the Justice Department into some of these areas”); id. 
at 326 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (stating that “[p]essimism about the likelihood of 
disclosures leading to results is not surprising” when one considers that more than 2000 fraud 
investigations were completed in 1984, “[y]et the Justice Department successfully prosecuted in that 
same year just 181 cases, including only one against one of the top 100 defense contractor[s]”); REP. 
DANIEL GLICKMAN, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 22–23 
(1986) (“[T]he Committee is concerned that there are instances in which the Government knew of the 
information that was the basis of the qui tam suit, but in which the Government took no action.”); 132 
CONG. REC. 22,340 (1986) (statement of Rep. Berkley Bedell) (“[I]n many cases, the authorities will 
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B. The Puzzle of DOJ Oversight 
Despite its finely wrought design, the FCA has generated enormous 
controversy, with DOJ’s exercise of its oversight authority acting as a 
particular lightning rod. Critics complain that DOJ too stingily deploys its 
termination authority.69 And statements by DOJ officials suggest that DOJ, 
at least in recent years, has had little inclination to put scarce public 
enforcement resources toward dismissing meritless cases over other, more 
affirmative enforcement efforts.70 
DOJ’s intervention decisionmaking has also engendered controversy, 
and for good reason. Among all of DOJ’s oversight powers, intervention 
appears to have the most powerful systemic effect: DOJ statistics have long 
suggested that intervened cases overwhelmingly generate recoveries while 
declined cases overwhelmingly end in dismissal. One common 
interpretation of this discrepancy is that DOJ selects cases on pure merits 
grounds such that the residuum of unintervened cases can be presumed 
meritless.71 Some federal courts—including the Fifth Circuit in a recent 
 
not prosecute for political reasons . . . . [T]he Justice Department has neither the political will nor the 
resources to always enforce all of the laws.”). 
69 See Matthew, supra note 16, at 301; Rich, supra note 16, at 1236. Only a few published opinions 
involve DOJ’s invocation of its termination authority. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange 
Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1346, 1354 (E.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d, 151 F.3d 
1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting DOJ motion to dismiss where the Government argued that continuation 
of the qui tam action would thwart implementation of key USDA policies related to the preservation 
and promotion of the citrus industry); United States v. Fiske, 968 F. Supp. 1347, 1354–55 (E.D. Ark. 
1997) (“[T]he Government’s proffered reason for urging dismissal—that the allegations are without 
merit—is a legitimate governmental reason and that dismissal is rationally related to the Government’s 
desire to clear from the Court docket a meritless claim.”). 
70 See False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 56 (statement of Michael F. Hertz, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (“We do not routinely devote 
the additional resources that would be needed to determine that a qui tam action is frivolous or to move 
to dismiss on those grounds.”); see also id. at 41 (letter from John T. Boese to Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(noting that “once the DOJ has decided not to intervene in a particular case, its commitment of 
resources to that case going forward is quite limited” and that there is “little incentive” for DOJ to stop 
a case “given the possibility, however remote, of some return on the Government’s limited ‘investment’ 
in the case once the DOJ has declined to intervene”). Even so, DOJ occasionally exercises its authority 
to dismiss cases. See, e.g., Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding 
DOJ decision to dismiss relator claim to be unreviewable). 
71 See, e.g., Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An 
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 975 tbl.2 (2007) (reporting data showing that 92% of 
cases where the U.S. declined to intervene and 73% of all qui tam actions were dismissed and noting 
that such a high rate of dismissal suggests a large number of qui tam actions are meritless); Elameto, 
supra note 16 (“The immense disparity between recoveries in qui tam actions in which the Government 
intervened and those in which it did not suggests that most qui tam actions brought without government 
intervention assert meritless or frivolous claims.”); Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers: 
Hearing on H.R. 1788 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2, 12–13 (2009) (statement 
of Marcia G. Madsen, Chamber of Commerce and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (noting 
“[t]he inescapable data regarding the low success rate of non-intervened qui tam cases” and concluding 
that “[w]hile the FCA—when deployed by the Government—has been effective in targeting fraud, the 
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opinion—appear to take this view as well.72 On this account DOJ is, 
invoking Part I’s stylized agency types, a welfare-maximizer engaged in 
faithful and accurate merits signaling. 
Others, however, question DOJ’s ability to gauge case merits and even 
suggest that DOJ intervention decisions are wholly arbitrary, with some 
relator counsel reporting that they can predict intervention based on which 
line-level DOJ attorney is quarterbacking the case investigation.73 These 
same voices further contend that the intervened–declined outcome 
discrepancy stems from the litigation leverage DOJ involvement brings. 
Some of this is simple optics: intervention ratchets up the negative 
publicity of fraud allegations by denying defendants the ability to cast 
litigation as the product of an overzealous and profit-driven private relator. 
Another possibility is that DOJ intervention makes discovery more efficient 
and thorough because DOJ attorneys can work directly with officials at the 
affected agency to identify and collect evidence.74 Finally, government 
involvement brings with it a powerful remedial option—debarment from 
further federal contracting, a corporate “death sentence” for many federal 
contractors and health care organizations—that is unavailable to relators 
litigating alone.75 
 
use of qui tam actions to detect and deter fraud has not”). Similar statements come from DOJ officials 
themselves. See, e.g., False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 193 (statement of Michael 
F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (asserting that the 
discrepancy in outcomes shows DOJ has been “appropriately judicious in its review of qui tam matters 
and has been highly successful in intervening in those cases that have true merit.” (emphasis added)). 
72 See supra note 17. 
73 See, e.g., Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Palo 
Alto, Cal. (June 13, 2012). 
74 DOJ attorneys can work internally with relevant agency officials to identify evidence pertaining 
to the alleged false claims. They can also tap law enforcement agents at the FBI and Office of the 
Inspector General to assist with any additional investigatory efforts. By contrast, relators litigating 
unintervened cases can obtain evidence only through blind formal discovery requests. See False Claims 
Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 102–03 (written statement of John T. Boese, Chamber of 
Commerce and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (“Agency documents are particularly critical, 
since the agency’s interpretation of a regulation or contract or grant term is essential to determining 
whether a particular claim or statement is ‘false’ and to calculating the amount of damages suffered by 
the Government.”). Importantly, there is evidence that DOJ does not necessarily share the fruits of its 
investigation with private relators. See Bradford A. Penney, Help Citizens Help Government, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 5, 1990, at 18 (“If the Justice Department elects not to intervene, the 
task of the relator in carrying forward with the case is a difficult one. The department typically resists 
handing over investigative files, requiring the relator to duplicate the department’s investigation without 
the government’s subpoena power and other investigative tools.”). 
75 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Note that the opposite logic seems possible as well: 
certain top defense contractors might be too large and too important to the provision of military 
hardware to debar from future contracting. See False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19, at 
32 (testimony of Tina M. Gonter) (noting, regarding a case that DOJ had declined to intervene in, that 
“there are only, you know, a few shipbuilders, you know, yards that actually can build submarines”); id. 
at 36 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (contending that government was reluctant to pursue a defense 
contractor accused of fraud “due to their future contracts with the Government”); Improved Efforts to 
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If DOJ intervention drives case outcomes separate and apart from pure 
case merit, then a natural question arises as to what mix of factors motivate 
DOJ intervention decisions in the first place. A standard view is that DOJ 
bases decisions on a simple risk–return calculus focused on case merits, 
likely recovery size, and agency resource constraints.76 According to some, 
resource constraints were especially acute in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks when government investigatory resources were diverted to 
counterterrorism efforts.77 Other proffered theories resemble Part I’s ideal 
welfare-maximizer agency: commentators suggest that DOJ is less likely to 
intervene where relator and relator’s counsel are perceived to have 
sufficient competence and resources to fully prosecute the action.78 
Remaining views are less charitable. Some critics cast DOJ as a 
politicker agency that pursues outsized recoveries it can tout as proof of 
agency prowess, extracting unfair settlements79 or joining cases, often 
belatedly, even where private enforcers are fully capable of vindicating 
government interests.80 A further charge is that politics drives intervention 
decisions. Thus, a sitting United States Senator has openly accused DOJ of 
declining or sitting on politically-charged qui tam cases, particularly 
defense-procurement fraud cases related to controversial military ventures 
in Iraq and Afghanistan during the administration of President George W. 
Bush (Bush43).81 And a top DOJ official in the Obama administration has 
 
Combat Health Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
112th Cong. 33 (2011) (testimony of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services) (“[S]ome major pharmaceutical corporations that have been 
convicted of crimes and paid hundreds of millions of dollars in False Claims Act settlements continue 
to participate in the Federal health care programs, in part because of the potential patient harm that 
could result from an exclusion.”). 
76 See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice’s 
Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409, 439 
(1993); WEST, supra note 17. 
77 See Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act: 
“Outsourcing” the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal Period, 
83 N.D. L. REV. 837, 852 (2007). 
78 See Kolis, supra note 76, at 438; WEST, supra note 17. 
79 See, e.g., Channing Turner, Amid Health Care Fraud and Abuse Crackdown, Lawyers Call for 
Reassessment, MAIN JUSTICE (July 14, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/07/14/
amid-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-crackdown-industry-lawyers-call-for-reassessment/ (noting position 
of top qui tam defense lawyers that FCA enforcement “has created a disconnect between enforcement 
efforts and the goal of encouraging compliance” because investigators “are pressured to seek greater 
and greater settlements instead of helping companies understand the statute’s complexities”). 
80 See Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, 
D.C. (Mar. 9, 2011) (noting concern among relator’s bar that DOJ often intervenes on eve of settlement, 
thus reducing the bounty share in cases litigated mostly or entirely by the relator). Cf. Kolis, supra note 
76, at 453 (noting that some relators resist DOJ intervention). 
81 See supra note 19; False Claims Act Judiciary Hearing, supra note 19 (statement of Sen. Patrick 
J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (decrying the “politicization of the Justice 
Department” and asking if DOJ has “resisted pursuing certain false claims cases for political reasons—
most notably those involving contracting fraud related to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan”); see also 
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likewise implied a lack of prosecutorial vigor by his Bush43 predecessors 
in defense-procurement cases in particular.82 
Still others assert that what matters most is not the merit of the fraud 
claim but its object. Nearly all qui tam cases allege fraud not on DOJ itself, 
but rather on some other federal agency. This is important, as, in the civil 
context, DOJ traditionally treats its relationship with such agencies as that 
of attorney and client and so is unlikely to pursue a claim without the 
primary agency’s support.83 Many declinations, DOJ critics assert, thus 
come from DOJ yielding to its client’s (i.e., the primary agency’s) desire to 
cover up lax oversight or other mistakes.84 They further maintain that 
personnel at certain agencies—among them the Departments of Defense 
and the Interior—resist government involvement in qui tam suits because 
of ignorance of the qui tam regime or because a revolving door with 
industry yields an agency leadership and organizational culture resistant to 
whistleblowing.85 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DOJ OVERSIGHT IN QUI TAM CASES 
This Part moves beyond anecdote by offering an empirical analysis of 
DOJ’s discharge of its oversight duties under the FCA. Deploying multiple 
identification strategies, I offer preliminary evidence on three types of 
questions raised above. First, which of Part I’s stylized agency types, if 
any, best fits DOJ’s oversight efforts? In particular, to what extent does 
DOJ terminate cases, leverage deficient private enforcement efforts, or 
intervene in order to police collusive settlements? Second, do DOJ 
intervention decisions appear merits-based, or do political or other 
“strategic” considerations also seem to drive DOJ intervention 
decisionmaking? And finally, can the sharp discrepancy in outcomes 
between intervened and unintervened cases be ascribed to DOJ’s merits-
screening capacity, or is it primarily an artifact of DOJ’s potent litigation 
leverage? In other words, and as framed previously, to what extent is DOJ a 
merits screener or a merits maker? 
 
Mark Thompson, Stealth Law: Whistleblowers and Their Lawyers Are Maneuvering to Cash in on 
Military Fraud, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 33, 36 (noting belief by one qui tam lawyer that officials in a 
“military-minded” administration “have every interest in seeing whistleblower lawsuits fail”). 
82 See Civil Division, supra note 19. In addition, a former federal prosecutor reported during an 
interview that he repeatedly watched his “career pass before [his] eyes” while working a qui tam case 
against Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root relating to Iraq war contracting because of 
heightened oversight by Main Justice. See Telephone Interview with Former Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 11, 2011). 
83 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of 
Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 562 (2003). 
84 See, e.g., Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in 
Washington, D.C. (June 13, 2012). 
85 Id. 
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A. Data 
In an effort to answer these questions, I collected unique data from two 
sources. First, I obtained a list of the more than 4000 unsealed qui tam 
lawsuits filed since 1986 along with certain case-level information via 
Freedom of Information Act requests served on DOJ.86 Second, I retrieved 
electronic docket sheets for the same set of cases and merged information 
from them with DOJ-provided data.87 The result is complete case 
information, including litigation dates, recoveries and relator shares, and 
party and counsel information for roughly 4000 qui tam cases over the 
period 1986–2011. Third, I supplemented this data by drawing a random 
sample of 500 cases and constructing a hand-coded dataset with a more 
fine-grained accounting of case characteristics for the 460 cases for which 
case file materials could be obtained.88 Finally, I conducted two dozen 
interviews with plaintiff- and defense-side qui tam lawyers and present and 
past officials and attorneys at DOJ’s Civil Fraud section and regional U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices to gain a more textured understanding of the regime. 
B. Descriptive Evidence on DOJ Gatekeeping 
An initial set of inferences can be drawn regarding the extent to which 
DOJ oversight deviates from Part I’s gatekeeper ideal via a range of 
descriptive evidence. To that end, this Section sets forth evidence 
regarding: (i) the frequency with which DOJ invokes its authority to 
terminate cases; (ii) DOJ’s use of its intervention authority, including its 
overall intervention rate and its success rate in intervened cases relative to 
 
86 Roughly 3000 qui tam suits remain under seal and likely fall into one of three categories. First, a 
substantial portion of the 3000 cases were filed in the past five years and remain under seal pending the 
completion of DOJ investigations. Second, a very small fraction of the 3000 cases are closed cases 
subject to various privileges, including the state secrets privilege, perhaps because the case implicates 
national security concerns. According to present and former DOJ attorneys, the rest of the 3000 cases 
are likely closed cases that remained sealed for a variety of reasons, including neglect by the judge to 
unseal the case, accidental failure by the relevant DOJ attorney to request unsealing upon case 
termination, or a successful relator effort to persuade the trial judge to keep the case sealed, typically 
because he or she remains employed by the company named in the suit. Some interviewees suggested 
that the latter type of case is likely to be concentrated in the time period prior to 2000 or 2001, when 
DOJ, under pressure from congressional overseers, changed policy and began to take a more aggressive 
stance in advocating unsealing of any terminated case. See Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud 
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 9, 2011); Interview with Relator Counsel, in 
S.F., Cal. (Oct. 7, 2010). Before that, the interviewees suggested, the likelihood that a case would 
remain sealed likely reflected the idiosyncratic approaches of U.S. Attorney offices as opposed to 
particular case attributes. See id. In sum, my sample is likely unrepresentative in at least two respects, 
containing more interventions than the full qui tam case population since 1986, and also more cases 
brought by current, as opposed to former, company employees. 
87 I used a PERL programming script to “scrape” information from particular fields on each docket 
sheet, including litigation dates and party and counsel names, and place it in an Excel spreadsheet. 
88 The forty cases for which case file materials could not be obtained were dropped from the 
sample, raising the possibility of some minor sampling bias. 
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unintervened ones, both across presidential administrations and case types; 
(iii) the timing of DOJ settlements; and (iv) the distribution of recoveries 
and recovery amounts. 
1. DOJ’s Use of Its Termination Authority.—A clear finding that 
emerges from the data is that DOJ rarely invokes its authority under the 
FCA to terminate qui tam cases. Indeed, analysis of the 460-case 
subsample of qui tam cases revealed exactly none in which DOJ exercised 
its termination authority. Applying standard principles of sampling error, 
this implies that DOJ invokes its termination authority in no more than 
roughly 4% of qui tam cases and likely far less than that.89 One 
interpretation is that DOJ is unconcerned with screening meritless cases or 
has concluded that doing so does not warrant expenditure of scarce public 
enforcement resources over other uses, such as affirmative enforcement 
efforts. This would confirm Part I’s theoretical prediction.90 It is also 
possible, however, that DOJ achieves the same ends in other, informal 
ways. For instance, DOJ might achieve case termination by privately 
conveying its disinterest in a case to relators, inducing them to dismiss 
cases prior to a DOJ case-election decision. DOJ terms such an outcome a 
“pre-election dismissal,” and former DOJ officials and attorneys confirmed 
that such dismissals nearly always come after DOJ has conveyed its 
intention to decline intervention.91 However, such cases appear to be 
limited in number: out of roughly 4000 cases, DOJ’s internal records 
assigned the “Dismissed Pre-Election” label to only 312 total cases. 
A second possibility is that DOJ sees no need to invoke its termination 
authority because it can induce “voluntary” dismissals by relators via 
intervention decisions by simply declining cases. The data offer at least 
 
89 I also attempted a rough assessment of the frequency of DOJ’s invocation of its termination 
authority by conducting electronic searches on case docket sheets across the full 4000-plus-case dataset 
of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the FCA statutory provision authorizing DOJ termination. Doing so 
identified only 30 cases across the study period in which DOJ exercised its authority to dismiss cases 
out from under private relators. Nearly all of these dismissals, moreover, were based on DOJ’s 
determination that a relator’s claim was jurisdictionally barred, typically on “public disclosure,” 
“original source,” or “first-to-file” grounds, or because of national security concerns relating to 
disclosure of classified information, and not a judgment about underlying case merits. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 2009 WL 911037, at *1, *6 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2009) (dismissing 
case upon government motion urging lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a result of FCA’s first-to-file 
bar); United States ex rel. Fay v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2008 WL 877180, at *1, *10 (D. Colo. 
Mar. 27, 2008) (granting dismissal upon government motion on basis of disclosure of classified 
information relating to national security). 
90 This should perhaps not come as a surprise: as noted previously, a top DOJ official recently 
testified before a congressional committee that lawyers under his direction do not direct scarce 
resources toward assessing case merits and weighing termination once DOJ has determined not to 
intervene. See supra note 70. My findings suggest that this has been true throughout the life of the post-
1986 regime. 
91 See, e.g., Interview with Former Assistant Dir., Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in 
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011). 
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some evidence of this: in the 460-case subsample, roughly 60% of cases in 
which DOJ declined intervention appeared to generate no further litigation 
prior to a voluntary dismissal by the relator. This, however, leaves 40% of 
cases in which DOJ declined intervention that did in fact generate 
postdeclination litigation prior to dismissal by the relator, making this a 
questionable strategy from a pure efficiency standpoint. 
2. DOJ’s Use of Its Intervention Authority.—Figures 2 and 3 use the 
data to explore DOJ’s exercise of its intervention authority. Figure 2 tracks 
DOJ interventions and declinations over the period 1986–2011, reporting 
annual intervention and declination tallies (the top stack), and intervention 
rates, both overall and across case types (the bottom stack).92 
 
 
92 Several points warrant mention regarding my coding of the data. The first two concern my 
coding of interventions and declinations, both here and in the regression analysis to come. First, I treat 
the small number of pre-election dismissals in my sample that lack an FCA recovery as declinations, in 
keeping with assurances from former DOJ attorneys, as just discussed, that such dismissals invariably 
result from DOJ’s signaling of its intention to decline intervention. A publicly available memo from the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania offers further grounds for doing 
so. See Memorandum from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. Pa., False Claims Act Cases: 
Government Intervention in Qui Tam (Whistleblower) Suits 2 [hereinafter Eastern District Memo], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Documents/fcaprocess2.pdf (noting that DOJ will 
sometimes “advise the relator that the Department of Justice intends to decline intervention” and that 
“[t]his usually, but not always, results in dismissal of the qui tam action”). Further confirmation of the 
propriety of my approach is found in relators’ motions for voluntary pre-election dismissal referencing 
an unofficial indication that DOJ will decline to intervene. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss of Globe 
Composite Solutions, Ltd. at 1–2, United States ex rel. Globe Composite Solutions v. Solar Constr., 
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Mass. 2007) (No. 1:05-cv-10004-JLT) (“As of the date of the filing of this 
motion, the relator has received no official notice from the United States as to whether it intends to 
intervene. However, all ‘unofficial’ indications have been that the United States intends to decline, and 
that a declination letter has been drafted and has been under review at the Department of Justice since 
May of this year.”). As a final validity check, a former DOJ attorney suggested during an interview that 
a unilateral relator decision to dismiss prior to DOJ’s election decision is a very unusual and rare event. 
See Interview with Former Assistant Dir., Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, 
D.C. (Mar. 10, 2011). This is especially true because even pre-election dismissals will typically result in 
the unsealing of the case. Thus, a relator who is reconsidering her filing decision may not be able to 
reliably protect her identity upon a pre-election dismissal, creating large incentives to continue with her 
claim once filed. See Kathleen McDermott, Qui Tam: An AUSA’s Perspective, TAXPAYERS AGAINST 
FRAUD Q. REV., Oct. 1997, at 23 (“[E]ven after the government declines to intervene and the relator 
determines not to proceed there is a danger that the public record will reveal the filing of suit that both 
the relator and the United States declined to pursue.”). Second, I coded the few pre-election dismissals 
in cases that generated a FCA recovery as interventions. Former DOJ attorneys uniformly agreed that 
these are cases in which DOJ negotiated a rapid settlement of the FCA claim after investigation, 
obviating the need for a formal intervention decision that was otherwise all but certain. See Interview 
with Former Assistant Dir., Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10, 
2011); Interview with Former Attorney, Civil Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, in Washington, D.C. 
(June 13, 2012); see also Eastern District Memo, supra, at 2 (noting that DOJ may “settle the pending 
qui tam action with the defendant prior to the intervention decision”). 
A second coding note concerns my effort to control for the possibility that relators in 
multidefendant actions can choose between filing numerous serial suits or a single omnibus suit. As 
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At least two broad conclusions can be drawn. First, DOJ intervenes 
approximately one-quarter of the time, with relatively higher intervention 
rates in health and defense cases and relatively lower intervention rates in 
“other” case types. Yet there is also considerable variability: even after the 
qui tam regime reached maturity in the mid- to late-1990s, intervention 
rates have ranged from as low as 18% (in 1999 and 2007) to as high as 
34% (in 2000), with similar peaks and valleys within case types—e.g., 
health cases in 2000 (high) and 2007 (low); defense cases in 2004 (high) 
and 2011 (low); “other” cases in 2005 (high) and 1999 (low). Some of 
 
described in more detail in prior empirical work, see Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1290–91, I have 
minimized the resulting measurement concerns by collapsing together and treating as a single “action” 
any suits with a common relator or relator law firm and at least two common litigation dates (filing 
date, DOJ case-election date, or settlement/termination date). 
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these differences, of course, may simply reflect sample-size limitations, but 
the overall pattern is still striking. 
 A second broad observation is that the data offer little facial support for 
the notion, advanced by some critics, that DOJ intervention decisions have 
had a partisan political cast over time.93 Rather, intervention rates appear 
similarly variable within and across presidential administrations. Perhaps 
most important of all in this regard, Figure 2 seems, on its face at least, to 
contradict the claim that the Bush43 Administration was less interventionist 
in defense-procurement cases in particular. Indeed, intervention rates in 
defense cases reached their peak (at 43%) in 2004, when George W. Bush 
was well into his presidency. I return to this issue in Part III.D and use 
more sophisticated statistical techniques to interrogate the data. 
Figure 3 shifts away from intervention rates and turns to the impact of 
DOJ intervention on qui tam litigation outcomes. The top stack shows that 
intervened cases have generated recoveries a whopping 90% of the time, 
with declined cases failing to achieve recoveries at the same overwhelming 
rate. This state of affairs has remained steady since 1986. This is consistent 
with the more anecdotal claims made about DOJ oversight. 
  
 
93 See supra notes 19, 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 3: DOJ RECOVERY RATES AND MEAN AND MEDIAN DOLLAR AMOUNTS BY 
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The bottom two stacks enrich the story by tracing the impact of DOJ 
intervention decisions on recovery dollar amounts rather than success rates. 
The second (middle) stack reports mean and median recoveries by 
intervened or declined status in all cases, whether the case ultimately 
produced a recovery (i.e., returned funds to the federal fisc) or not. The 
third (bottom) stack examines those same trends constraining the sample to 
only those cases that produced a recovery.94 Interestingly, while the gap 
between win rates in intervened and declined cases has remained wide and 
steady, the gap between the average recovery in successful intervened and 
declined cases has not. Rather, recoveries in intervened cases have risen 
steadily over the life of the regime, with mean recoveries in declined cases 
showing a more recent increase, driven by a handful of large wins in cases 
DOJ declined.95 Even so, examining the data as a whole and focusing on 
recovery dollars rather than success rates, the centrality of DOJ 
intervention is hard to ignore: between 1986 and 2011, intervened cases 
generated roughly $24 billion in recoveries, or 94% of the total recovery, 
while declined cases generated only $1.5 billion in recoveries, or 6%. 
3. The Timing of DOJ Settlements.—We might also draw inferences 
about DOJ decisionmaking by considering the timing of recoveries. An 
important assumption of Part I’s theoretical analysis is that an agency 
vested with gatekeeper authority akin to DOJ’s powers under the FCA will 
use those powers in politically conscious ways, seeking to maximize 
certain outcomes—total wins, total dollars recovered—over other, less 
politically salient measures.96 It follows that we might also expect to see 
patterns in the timing of case outcomes, as a politically conscious agency 
seeks to bring home successful cases prior to the end of a measurement 
period. This might be especially true in the FCA context because of DOJ’s 
continuing practice of holding a press conference and issuing a press 
release soon after the conclusion of the government fiscal year on 
September 30 announcing the agency’s annual FCA take.97 
 
94 This does not include cases that produced a damages recovery via a claim for retaliation under 
the FCA’s anti-retaliation provisions. 
95 See, e.g., United States & State of Illinois ex rel. Mason v. Medline Indus., Inc., No. 07-cv-
05615 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 4, 2007) (recovery of $85 million in 2011 in unintervened case); United 
States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., No. 07-cv-00960 (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 21, 2007) (recovery of $57.7 
million in 2010 in unintervened case); United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, No. 03-cv-
0457 (E.D. Cal. filed Mar. 7, 2003) (recovery of $67.5 million in 2009 in unintervened case). Note that 
the listed settlement amounts for each of these cases are, as with the other empirical findings reported 
herein, drawn from my dataset as constructed from information reported by DOJ pursuant to my FOIA 
requests and the cases’ electronic docket sheets. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
97 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $5 Billion in False 
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
December/12-ag-1439.html (announcing “the largest annual recovery in the Department’s history”); 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in 
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Figure 4 reports total qui tam recovery counts and dollars by calendar-
year quarter across the life of the post-1986 FCA regime. As expected, 
recovery counts and amounts have spiked substantially in Q3, the end of 
the federal government’s fiscal year. This strongly suggests (but does not 
prove) that DOJ rushes to conclude settlements—perhaps even altering its 
settlement calculus—to “book” recoveries prior to the end of the 
government fiscal year. Harder to explain under this theory is the roughly 
comparable Q4 spike in recovery amounts. One possibility is that DOJ 
lawyers endeavor to close out cases before the fiscal year’s end but fail to 
do so, with the result that many recoveries spill over into Q4.98 Another 
possibility is that corporate defendants, not DOJ, are more receptive to 
settlements in Q4 as the tax year draws to a close.99 Either of these 
dynamics offers a plausible explanation for why Q4 also shows a 
pronounced uptick in recovery amounts relative to the other two quarters. 
 
Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-
1665.html (announcing that DOJ had set “[r]ecords for [r]ecoveries” in 2011). 
98 A useful analogy comes from the tax context: one former enforcement official at the Internal 
Revenue Service noted that May of each year was euphemistically referred to within the Service as 
“May Madness” as agents hurried to reach provisional agreement on settlement terms so that they could 
secure the necessary authorization up the agency management chain in time for September closure. But 
the resulting logjam during the final months of the government fiscal year meant that some agents could 
not obtain sign off in time. See Telephone Interview with former IRS Div. Comm’r, Internal Revenue 
Serv. (Sept. 12, 2012). 
99 The same IRS enforcement official noted above, however, suggested that this may be a 
secondary factor. Perhaps more important are reporting requirements in connection with end-of-year 
financial filings. Once settlement negotiations have begun, public and even private companies assume 
reporting obligations regarding “contingent liabilities.” This can also constrain stock trading and other 
strategic moves by the company. For these and other reasons, a defendant company might have strong 
incentives to simply settle a matter in advance of year-end regulatory and shareholder filings. Id. 
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4. The Distribution of Qui Tam Recoveries.—A final descriptive 
view seeks to draw inferences about DOJ’s intervention calculus by 
expanding on earlier work by Kwok examining recovery patterns across 
intervened and declined qui tam cases.100 It is a plausible assumption that 
the fraud perpetrated on the government—and, in turn, DOJ intervention 
decisions based on objective case “merit”—would produce a frequency 
distribution of recoveries that resembles a normal or log-normal curve, with 
relatively larger numbers of recoveries taking middling values and 
relatively smaller numbers of recoveries taking higher or lower values. By 
contrast, strategic DOJ action might generate deviations from normality. If, 
for instance, DOJ adopts a strategy of systematically leveraging lower 
value cases, then qui tam recoveries in intervened cases will exhibit a 
“humped” distribution at lower recovery values. Similarly, a politicker 
agency—invoking Part I’s stylized agency types—might generate a skew 
toward relatively larger recoveries as the agency seeks out marquee 
enforcement opportunities. Finally, DOJ pursuit of a combined politicker 
and merits-maximizer strategy—that is, an agency that seeks to pad its 
recovery total by cherry-picking larger, marquee cases while at the same 
time bolstering its win–loss record by taking up a stream of relatively 
smaller, easier-to-win cases—might yield a bimodal, “double-humped” 
distribution in which relatively higher and lower value awards 
predominate. In such a situation, recoveries in declined cases will occupy 
more of a middle band of recovery value, since these cases pad neither 
DOJ’s recovery total nor its win rate. 
Kwok previously found no evidence of a “double-humped” 
distribution from which to infer DOJ was actively leveraging smaller value 
cases.101 However, any analysis of possible DOJ leveraging should also 
take account of the strategic nature of interactions between DOJ, relators, 
and relator counsel. As noted previously, relators and their counsel may not 
have sufficient incentive to bring lower value cases except where DOJ can 
credibly commit to playing a leveraging role.102 Indeed, without DOJ 
intervention—and, more importantly, the possible boost in the probability 
of a recovery that goes along with it—relators and their counsel may not 
surface certain cases at all. But, as noted previously, DOJ efforts to signal 
such commitment will suffer from a basic exchange problem, since DOJ 
cannot perfectly assure relators it will not renege and engage in ex post 
opportunism.103 One implication is that repeat players within the system 
should be better positioned to overcome such problems.104 A further 
 
100 See Kwok, supra note 30. 
101 See id. at 12–14. 
102 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; 
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 141–42 (1988). 
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implication is that, to the extent DOJ seeks to leverage small-value claims, 
we should see the greatest evidence of it with respect to cases brought by 
repeat players within the regime. We might also expect that a DOJ 
leveraging role will only emerge over time as a cooperative, endogenous 
equilibrium among DOJ, relators, and relator counsel is established. 
Figure 5 presents histograms of logged recovery amounts (in 2011 
dollars) in intervened and declined qui tam cases between 1986 and 
2011.105 The first histogram in the top row presents frequencies of logged 
recovery amounts for intervened and declined cases, respectively, in the 
full sample. Successive histograms in the top row present the same analysis 
subset by whether the case was brought by “Top Counsel,” defined as any 
case brought by a firm with ten or more prior qui tam filings at the time of 
DOJ’s election decision, or “Other Counsel,” defined as a firm with nine or 
fewer prior filings. The remaining rows duplicate the top-row analysis, 
constraining the sample to cases elected during the Clinton, Bush43, and 
Obama Administrations, respectively.106 
  
 
105 A histogram is a graphical method for displaying the shape of a distribution by breaking data 
into intervals and reporting the frequency with which observations fall into each. Using a logarithmic 
transformation is a common means of reducing the number of intervals, thus providing a more 
meaningful visual representation. 
106 I omit the first Bush (Bush41) Administration from the presentation because of the limited 
number of cases during that time period. 
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FIGURE 5: FREQUENCY OF LOGGED RECOVERY AMOUNTS IN INTERVENED AND DECLINED QUI 

























The results offer critical perspective on DOJ’s intervention calculus. 
First, in the sample as a whole, recoveries in intervened cases are 
characterized by a modest rightward skew, with the right-hand tail plainly 
longer than the left-hand tail.107 One interpretation is that this confirms a 
weak DOJ preference for higher value cases. But a counter-interpretation is 
possible as well: a shortened left-hand tail might also suggest a DOJ that is 
eager to take relatively lower value cases—either because they will not 
otherwise attract sufficient private enforcement or to pad its win rate—so 
long as the expected return rises above a basic break-even threshold. Put 
another way, low-value cases are likely to be lower bounded, while high-
value cases will not be upper bounded. 
 
107 A distribution is “skewed” if one tail—that is, one end—extends out further than the other. Note 
that, because Figure 5’s histograms are based on logarithmic transformations of recovery amounts, the 
visual presentation will underrepresent the degree of rightward skew compared to a nonlogged 
distribution by compressing recovery amounts at the higher end of case value. 
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Whatever the interpretation on this point, the distribution of recoveries 
in the sample as a whole plainly allows us to reject some of the more 
overheated claims about DOJ’s intervention calculus. Indeed, to the extent 
DOJ pursues high-value claims, it is not a dominant strategy, as DOJ 
clearly pursues plenty of middle- and low-value claims as well. Note, 
however, that this does not rule out the possibility that DOJ is nonetheless 
acting as a politicker agency, intervening even where its presence in a case 
adds little or no value. 
The portrait grows more complicated, however, when the subsetted 
results are considered. Indeed, the histograms reveal at least some double 
humping of recovery frequencies, both in cases initiated by “Top Counsel” 
in particular and during more recent time periods. Importantly, the spread 
between humps is quite large: for “Top Counsel” cases in the full sample 
(the first row, middle histogram), the two peaks in evidence represent 
average recoveries of roughly $630,000 and $6.3 million, respectively, 
leaving a nontrivial middle-value trough in between.108 Note, however, that 
double humping is not confined to “Top Counsel,” particularly during the 
Bush43 and Obama periods, as “Other Counsel” recoveries in these more 
recent time periods likewise show at least some evidence of double 
humping, complicating interpretation. On one hand, if we believe that only 
more experienced counsel can solve the exchange problem that afflicts 
initiation of lower value cases, then double humping in cases brought by 
less experienced counsel tends to cut against the possibility that DOJ is 
actively seeking to leverage lower value cases. And yet, it may simply be 
the case that time, rather than counsel experience, is more important to the 
emergence of a cooperative equilibrium in which private enforcers 
confidently feed DOJ a supply of lower value cases.109 
 
 * * * 
 
Taken together, the above descriptive results permit an initial set of 
conclusions about DOJ’s discharge of its oversight duties and possible 
deviations from Part I’s ideal gatekeeper role. First, the paucity of DOJ 
termination efforts strongly suggests that DOJ is not playing a pure 
welfare-maximizer role—or, at the least, views its main responsibilities 
 
108 I obtained these numbers by undoing the logarithmic transformation at 5.8 and 6.8, respectively. 
One way to gauge the significance of the double humping in evidence in the “Top Counsel” portion of 
the “Full Sample” analysis is to use a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to compare its distribution to the 
distribution in the “Other Counsel” portion of the “Full Sample” analysis to its immediate right. Doing 
so finds a highly significant result (p = 0.000), implying that there exists a difference between the two 
distributions that cannot be explained by chance. 
109 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (noting ways that DOJ and private enforcers 
might overcome their exchange problem). 
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otherwise. Part IV’s discussion returns to this issue and discusses ways 
policymakers might alter DOJ incentives in that regard. 
A similar, though more tentative, conclusion follows from the 
distribution of recoveries across intervened and declined qui tam cases. In 
particular, the dearth of recoveries in declined cases and the lack of “double 
humping” in the histogram analysis together suggest that DOJ, in making 
intervention decisions, does not prioritize leveraging overmatched relator 
counsel or inviting and pursuing lower value claims. To be sure, this does 
not preclude the possibility that DOJ is playing a welfare-maximizer role. 
For instance, it remains possible that DOJ intervenes in all cases with a 
threshold level of merit but then allocates very different amounts of 
resources to cases postintervention, thus effectively delegating greater 
amounts of enforcement authority to fully competent enforcers as a way to 
conserve resources for other cases.110 But because so few declined cases 
yield recoveries, it will be difficult to observe such efforts empirically. 
As a final note, while the histograms defy definitive interpretation, the 
analysis nonetheless highlights some of the difficult trade-offs implicit in 
available DOJ intervention strategies. A resource-constrained DOJ that 
systematically makes intervention decisions with an eye to leveraging 
smaller value claims will give up recovery value—likely middle-value 
cases—in so doing. Thus, if the current DOJ de-emphasized cases falling at 
or near the lower value hump in evidence in Figure 5 and shifted its efforts 
to declined cases that occupy the more middling range of recovery value, 
the overall result might be greater total recoveries. To that extent, 
leveraging may, at least from the perspective of a rent-seeker agency, come 
at a substantial cost. 
C. “Strategic” Correlates of DOJ Intervention: 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
Further progress in understanding DOJ’s gatekeeper activities requires 
a push beyond simple descriptive statistics. To explore more fully possible 
correlates of DOJ intervention decisions in particular, I next specify a logit 
model, with the case as the unit of analysis, of the following form: 
 
Pr |yi = 1| = 1/(1 + exp(-(α + β1X11 + β2Y2 . . . βkZk))) 
 
110 To that extent, a Florida district court’s 2001 decision reveals what may be a pattern: DOJ 
reportedly “sought and received assurances from [relator’s] counsel of their ability and willingness to 
commit the necessary resources to the case and to undertake the principal role in prosecuting the 
litigation.” United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 
(M.D. Fla. 2001). Interviews with top relator counsel likewise established that DOJ has in the past 
conditioned intervention on a relator firm’s willingness to commit to provide an itemized list of 
litigation resources to the effort, including a defined number of private lawyers (requiring the firm to 
associate with other firms) as well as experts and computer equipment necessary to analyze large 
amounts of data. Interview with Relator Counsel, in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 7, 2010). 
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where y represents the probability of winning DOJ intervention and X, Y, 
and Z represent independent variables of interest. 
Existing theory and evidence suggest a number of variables that will be 
important determinants of DOJ intervention or are logically necessary 
control variables. The Appendix presents descriptive statistics for these 
variables as well as those used in the separate regression analysis in Part 
III.D. 
An initial pair of variables explores the impact of resource constraints 
on DOJ decisionmaking.111 I first constructed a measure, 
DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT, equal to the number of active, intervened qui 
tam cases divided by the number of attorneys at DOJ’s Civil Fraud section 
during the year of each intervention decision in each sample case.112 My 
expectation is that DOJ will be less likely to intervene in cases as resource 
constraints rise and vice versa. In addition, and as noted previously, some 
have suggested that the 9/11 terrorist attacks redirected substantial civil 
investigatory resources previously available to DOJ to counterterrorism 
efforts.113 To test for a resource-based effect on DOJ decisionmaking in 
9/11’s aftermath, I constructed a measure, 911RESOURCECONSTRAINT, 
equal to 730 minus the number of days after September 11, 2001, that DOJ 
rendered an election decision for two years following the attacks.114 The 
result is a measure running from zero to 730, with cases elected 
immediately following September 11, 2001, taking the highest value and 
 
111 It is relatively uncontroversial that resource constraints affect agency enforcement action. See, 
e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 22, at 757–60 (reviewing literature linking SEC resource limitations to 
a more selective enforcement strategy and slower agency action). For commentary on the effect of 
resource constraints on DOJ intervention decisionmaking in particular, see supra notes 76–78 and 
accompanying text. 
112 Attorney counts were constructed using congressional testimony characterizing the number of 
Civil Fraud attorneys in a given year as well as historical office phone lists provided by former Civil 
Fraud attorneys, with missing years then filled in via linear interpolation. Note further that, while my 
case-level data allow me to precisely track the total number of intervened cases at any point in time, I 
can only imperfectly observe the extent to which DOJ lawyers are actively litigating open cases. In 
complex litigation, cases often lay fallow for long stretches of time, flaring up around bouts of 
discovery (e.g., document review, depositions) and motion practice, with only the latter reflected on 
docket sheets. Regardless, my construction of the variable assumes that DOJ officials understand and 
take account of litigation’s cadence when deciding whether to intervene in the marginal case. All else 
equal, a DOJ that is litigating more intervened cases is more resource constrained than one litigating 
fewer. 
113 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
114 Alternative specifications of this variable include a simple dummy variable taking a value of one 
during the year following the attacks or a logarithmic transformation of the number of days after 9/11 to 
reflect more substantial resource constraints in the period immediately following the attacks, with the 
effect diminishing over time. In addition, one could employ different assumptions about the duration of 
post-9/11 resource constraints, thus constructing a variable pegged to, say, 365 days (assuming the 
resource constraints lasted one year) or 1095 days (three years). None of these variants yielded a 
materially different result in the models reported below. 
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reflecting relatively greater 9/11-related resource constraints, cases elected 
two years later, on September 11, 2003, taking the lowest value and 
reflecting relatively lower post-9/11 resource constraints, and cases before 
or after the two-year window taking a value of zero. The expectation is that 
this variable will negatively predict intervention, as resource scarcity 
compelled DOJ to concentrate its investigatory and litigation efforts on a 
smaller set of cases following the attacks. 
A second set of variables follows other research exploring the 
relationship of repeat play among qui tam enforcers and DOJ intervention 
decisions, with more experienced (repeat) relators being relatively less 
likely to win DOJ intervention and more experienced counsel relatively 
more likely to do so.115 EXPERIENCEDRELATOR is a simple indicator 
variable set to one if the relator in question has filed at least one prior case. 
TOPRELATORFIRM and MIDRELATORFIRM are also indicator variables, set 
to one in any case in which the most experienced firm providing relator-
side representation had previously filed ten or more or between one and 
nine prior cases, respectively. In the regression models, “one-shotter” 
counsel thus serve as the baseline category. 
Empirical studies of regulatory enforcement have found that 
government enforcement officials are less likely to file enforcement actions 
against larger companies, perhaps because such companies have greater 
political clout or resources to put toward legal defense.116 Either possibility 
could impact the risk–return calculus of a strategic DOJ or primary agency. 
Accordingly, I created an indicator variable, FORTUNE100, denoting cases 
in which at least one defendant in the action is listed among Fortune 100 
companies during one or more years of the study period.117 I also created an 
indicator variable, DEFENSE50, denoting cases brought against firms 
reported by the Department of Defense in one or more years of the study 
period as one of the top fifty recipients of defense-procurement dollars. A 
DOJ focused on maximizing recovery dollars or win rates might shy away 
from cases involving either type of defendant not only because of their 
relative size but also because they might be thought too important to debar 
 
115 See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1289, 1299, 1313. 
116 See, e.g., Gadinis, supra note 39, at 682–83 (summarizing findings that larger Wall Street firms 
and their employees fared better in SEC enforcement actions along multiple dimensions, including the 
severity of sanctions sought and imposed and the likelihood that individual employees as opposed to the 
firm as an entity would be subject to regulatory action); Wayne B. Gray & Mary E. Deily, Compliance 
and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 96, 
108, 110 (1996) (finding evidence that the Environmental Protection Agency was less likely to bring 
pollution-related enforcement actions against larger steel companies); Rajabiun, supra note 38 (noting 
possible public enforcer preference for actions against “firms less likely to be able to defend 
themselves”). 
117 Prior to the mid-1990s, Fortune maintained separate lists for manufacturing and service 
companies. For those years, I combined the lists based on market capitalization to generate a measure 
that is comparable to subsequent years. 
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from further government contracts, reducing DOJ’s litigation leverage upon 
intervention.118 
To test the extent to which DOJ might seek to leverage the efforts of 
less experienced or less sophisticated counsel, I interacted the two counsel 
measures described previously, TOPRELATORFIRM and MIDRELATORFIRM, 
with FORTUNE100. If DOJ takes account of imbalances in relator and 
defense capacities, then we might expect to see higher intervention rates in 
cases pitting MIDRELATORFIRM counsel against Fortune 100 companies 
(where imbalances are small but remediable) compared to cases brought by 
TOPCOUNSEL firms against similarly well-heeled defendants (where 
imbalances are small or nonexistent). That said, and as noted previously, 
there is little clear evidence that DOJ has adopted a strategy of delegating 
enforcement authority to more competent enforcers by declining cases, 
making it unlikely that the interaction terms will detect a leveraging 
effect.119 
A fourth set of variables explores possible political correlates of DOJ 
intervention decisionmaking. To test for the possibility of overhead 
political control at DOJ or the primary agency, I constructed a dummy 
variable, CASEELECTEDDEM, indicating whether the case reached a DOJ 
intervention decision during the Clinton or Obama Administrations, the 
two periods of Democratic control of the Executive Branch in my sample. 
A related dummy variable, CASEFILEDDEM, indicates if the case was filed 
during the Clinton or Obama Administrations and thus seeks to control for 
once-removed effects of partisan control: if would-be relators perceive a 
partisan political slant to DOJ intervention decisionmaking, then they may 
be more likely to file suit when DOJ is controlled by a sympathetic 
administration, resulting in more and more marginal (weaker) 
complaints.120 
A fifth cluster of indicator variables is designed to test whether 
intervention is more or less likely when the alleged fraud concerns federal 
programs overseen by particular primary agencies. As noted previously, 
DOJ treats its relationship with primary agencies as that of attorney and 
client, and some have suggested that certain departments and agencies are 
less likely to support intervention, either because of overhead political 
 
118 See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Side Effects May Include Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 3, 2010, at 1 (noting 
the possibility that “some companies are ‘too big to debar’ from government contracts, since doing so 
would just hurt patients needing medicine” (quoting Lew Morris, chief counsel for the inspector general 
of the Department of Health and Human Services)). 
119 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
120 See John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications 
Litigation, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 501, 502–03 (2005) (accounting for strategic litigant selection effects 
in model of judicial decisionmaking); see also David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and 
Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (noting importance of taking 
account of litigant selection effects in deriving empirical estimates related to civil litigation). 
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control or organizational resistance.121 The models reported below include 
dummy variables that take a value of one in any case alleging fraud on each 
of three executive departments, including the Departments of Health and 
Human Services (HEALTH), Defense (DEFENSE), and the Interior 
(INTERIOR). These three are the agencies most frequently implicated in qui 
tam suits—and, in the case of Defense and Interior, are also commonly 
perceived by relators’ counsel as most subject to patterns of political 
control or organizational opposition to qui tam. 
A final set of variables explores the extent to which DOJ makes 
intervention decisions in order to police collusive settlements. Here I 
exploit the Ninth Circuit’s Killingsworth decision, as described previously, 
which held that DOJ possesses an absolute veto right over a proposed 
settlement only where it has previously intervened in the case.122 To test for 
Killingsworth’s possible impact, I created a dummy variable, 
NINTHCIRCUITRULING, taking a value of one in any sample case filed and 
drawing a DOJ election decision in a federal district court within the Ninth 
Circuit after Killingsworth. I also include a further pair of dummy 
variables, AFTERNINTH and NINTHCIRCUIT, to ensure I am measuring the 
differences-in-differences effect of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.123 If DOJ has 
been more likely to intervene in district courts bound by Killingsworth in 
order to preserve its ability to veto private settlements, then the main 
variable of the three should show a positive effect on DOJ’s propensity to 
intervene. 
The remaining variables in the models are time controls, including a 
pair of variables, CASEFILEDYEAR and CASEELECTEDYEAR, which 
account for the possibility of a simple time trend keyed either to litigant 
filings or DOJ case elections. 
Column (A) in Table 2 presents the regression results without the 
counsel and Fortune 100 interaction terms designed to detect DOJ efforts to 
leverage private enforcement capacity. Column (B) reports the full model. 
In a logit model, raw coefficients are not directly interpretable and so are 
reported as odds ratios. In the discussion below, the results are further 
transformed into marginal effects, defined as the change in probability of 
 
121 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
123 These additional variables wash (or “difference”) out any trends that are common to the Ninth 
Circuit and other circuits and might otherwise obscure Killingsworth’s true effect. For further 
explanation of the “differences-in-differences” approach, see infra notes 133–35 and accompanying 
text. Note, however, that I do not include similar dummy variables for the decisions of other U.S. 
Courts of Appeals that have come out the other way. See supra note 62. This is based on my view that 
the weight of authority at the district court level in all circuits apart from the Ninth is that DOJ enjoys 
an absolute veto right, leaving little theoretical reason to believe DOJ would seek to protect its veto 
rights any more vigorously within those circuits with published decisions declining to follow 
Killingsworth than in any other district court outside the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, I include only 
variables for the Ninth Circuit’s unique decision. 
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DOJ intervention based on a one-unit rise or fall in the independent 
variable in question or, for dummies, a move from zero to one.124  
As Table 2 indicates, a number of variables are statistically significant 
and substantively important. First, the findings suggest that DOJ’s 
intervention calculus is sensitive to resource constraints. All else equal, a 
one-unit increase in DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT—admittedly a substantial 
increase for a variable ranging from zero to 1.07—correlates with a roughly 
11% drop in the likelihood of DOJ intervention. In practical terms, DOJ 
was significantly less likely to intervene in cases in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, as DOJ’s inventory of intervened cases reached its peak, compared 
to earlier in the post-1986 regime’s lifespan, with relatively greater 
likelihood of intervention, all else equal, during the later 2000s as a drop in 
qui tam filings eased resource constraints somewhat. That said, the 
September 11 terrorist attacks do not appear to have affected DOJ 





124  More specifically, a “marginal effect” measures the change in the dependent variable for each 
one-unit increase in the relevant independent variable holding all other independent variables at their 
means. For a useful primer on odds ratios in logistic regression and why marginal effects provide a 
more behaviorally interpretable metric, see FAQ: How Do I Interpret Odds Ratios in Logistic 
Regression?, UCLA: STATISTICAL CONSULTING GRP., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/
general/odds_ratio.htm (last visited July 22, 2013). 
125 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Note that the fact that the 911RESOURCECONSTRAINT 
coefficient is precisely estimated at 1 raises the concern that the variable might be perfectly collinear 
with another variable. However, and as reported in note 114, supra, the inclusion of alternative 
specifications of the 9/11 variable in the models did not produce materially different results. 
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TABLE 2: LOGIT MODEL PREDICTING DOJ INTERVENTION IN QUI TAM CASES, 1986–2011 






DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT 0.513** 0.514** 
 (0.174) (0.175) 
911RESOURCECONSTRAINT 1.000 1.000 
 (0.000349) (0.000349) 
EXPERIENCEDRELATOR 0.666*** 0.666*** 
 (0.0728) (0.0728) 
TOPRELATORFIRM 1.760*** 1.726*** 
 (0.227) (0.233) 
MIDRELATORFIRM 1.056 1.062 
 (0.0884) (0.0921) 
FORTUNE100 0.657*** 0.654** 
 (0.103) (0.140) 
DEFENSE50 0.588** 0.588** 





HEALTH 1.548*** 1.550*** 
 (0.156) (0.156) 
DEFENSE 1.613*** 1.614*** 
 (0.215) (0.215) 
INTERIOR 1.065 1.067 
 (0.385) (0.386) 
NINTHCIRCUITRULING 2.356** 2.348** 
 (0.834) (0.832) 
CASEFILEDDEM 0.980 0.979 
 (0.123) (0.123) 
CASEELECTEDDEM 0.965 0.965 
 (0.102) (0.102) 
CASEFILEDYEAR 0.484*** 0.484*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) 
CASEELECTEDYEAR 1.866*** 1.867*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0540) 
Observations 4326 4326 
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.172 
Chi square test 0 0 
Notes: Dependent variable in both models is a binary indicator as to whether DOJ intervened in 
the case. Lower order interaction terms (AFTERNINTH, NINTHCIRCUIT) are omitted from the 
presentation. All coefficients are reported as odds ratios, with marginal effects of significant 
variables presented in the text. Significance as follows: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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My results likewise confirm the findings of past research regarding the 
role of repeat play within the qui tam regime: experienced relators who 
have filed at least one prior qui tam suit (EXPERIENCEDRELATOR) are 10% 
less likely to achieve DOJ intervention than one-shotters, while relator-side 
counsel with ten or more cases in their past portfolio of representations 
(TOPRELATORFIRM) are roughly 9% more likely to win DOJ 
intervention.126 This latter result, when combined with the finding that DOJ 
is resource constrained, is troubling. If DOJ selects more meritorious cases 
brought by more experienced and capable qui tam plaintiffs’ firms, but its 
decisionmaking also appears sensitive to resource constraints, then this 
may suggest a perverse allocation of public resources. To be sure, and as 
noted previously, DOJ might commit fewer resources to cases brought by 
more competent private enforcers, effecting an implicit delegation of 
enforcement authority.127 And yet, intervention still entails assigning a line-
level attorney to the case who must then fully engage in motions practice 
and discovery. To that extent, DOJ participation is not costless, particularly 
if doing so precludes intervention in other meritorious cases. I return to this 
issue in Part IV. 
The results for FORTUNE100 and DEFENSE50 are consistent with 
expectation and statistically significant. All else equal, DOJ is roughly 7% 
less likely to intervene in cases brought against Fortune 100 companies, 
and 8% less likely to intervene in cases brought against top defense 
contractors. Of course, the precise causal mechanism here cannot be 
pinpointed. Low intervention rates might result from political influence, 
DOJ timidity in the face of the greater litigation resources such defendants 
can deploy, or, in the case of large, critically important defense contractors, 
the reduced litigation leverage DOJ can expect to have because of the 
unavailability of debarment from government business as a remedial 
option. An alternative explanation is that Fortune 100 companies draw 
more marginal qui tam complaints because they are perceived by relators as 
having deeper pockets or being more sensitive to public relations concerns. 
Neither of these latter possibilities, however, offers a fully persuasive 
rejoinder, particularly plaintiff perceptions of deeper pockets, which should 
also translate into greater available defense-side litigation resources. 
Another striking finding is the substantial effect of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Killingsworth ruling on DOJ intervention decisions. All else equal, post-
Killingsworth cases initiated in district courts encompassed by the Ninth 
Circuit were roughly 14% more likely to win intervention, suggesting that 
the doctrinal threat to DOJ’s ability to veto collusive settlements had a 
 
126 These effects are broadly consistent with findings from an earlier regression analysis using the 
same data as here: first, that repeat relators are substantially less likely to win DOJ intervention but 
achieve larger recoveries when they do; and second, that repeat counsel are both more likely to win 
intervention and achieve larger recoveries. See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1313. 
127 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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substantial impact on its intervention calculus. Rerunning the analysis 
using placebo versions of NINTHCIRCUITRULING—that is, artificially 
moving the date of the Ninth Circuit’s decision forward or backward in 
time—confirmed the robustness of this finding.128 
The variables designed to capture partisan political drivers of DOJ 
decisionmaking or the effect of political control or organizational resistance 
at particular primary agencies returned mixed results. First, neither 
CASEELECTEDDEM, nor its litigant-expectation variant, CASEFILEDDEM, 
produced statistically significant results. I return to the question of whether 
partisan political control of DOJ might be driving intervention 
decisionmaking using a more sophisticated empirical approach in Part 
III.D. By contrast, the agency dummies yielded strong and statistically 
significant results, in keeping with Figure 2’s presentation of different 
intervention rates across case types. All else equal, cases alleging fraud on 
the Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of 
Defense were 7% and 8% more likely, respectively, to draw DOJ 
intervention. By contrast, cases alleging fraud on the Department of the 
Interior, which has drawn significant fire for internal corruption and alleged 
partisanship of agency leaders,129 did not show a statistically significant 
difference relative to other case types. 
Finally, the cluster of variables designed to test possible DOJ efforts to 
leverage less competent counsel in cases brought against Fortune 100 
companies reveals no evidence that DOJ is playing such a role, with neither 
interaction term returning a statistically significant result. This may just 
confirm that, to the extent DOJ leverages the litigation efforts of less 
competent counsel, it manifests in the amount of resources DOJ allocates 
across cases rather than formal intervention decisions. 
To be sure, the regression findings should be viewed with caution. The 
most obvious problem is omitted variable bias: because we cannot directly 
observe case quality, estimates of the marginal effect of various covariates 
 
128 Despite the apparent robustness of the Killingsworth findings, it remains possible that some 
other factor explains DOJ’s greater post-Killingsworth propensity to intervene in cases within the Ninth 
Circuit. For instance, some qui tam practitioners suggested that an alternative explanation for DOJ’s 
more liberal intervention stance is the California presence of law firm Phillips & Cohen LLP, which 
enjoys one of the highest DOJ intervention rates among highly active relator-side firms. However, the 
data tend to point away from a Phillips & Cohen effect. Among other things, Phillips & Cohen was just 
as active in the pre-Killingsworth period. More importantly, California is also home to one of the other 
most active relator-side law firms, Warren Benson Law Group, which has one of the lower DOJ 
intervention rates among relator-side firms. See Engstrom, supra note 4, at 1302 (reporting firm-
specific success rates). 
129 See Ian Urbina, Inspector General’s Inquiry Faults Actions of Federal Drilling Regulators, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 2010, at A16 (noting critics’ concerns about “a culture of lax oversight and cozy ties to 
industry”); Thomas Frank, Op-Ed., The Gulf Spill and the Revolving Door, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2010, 
at A17 (noting similar concerns). For a more skeptical scholarly view, see Christopher Carrigan, 
Captured by Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill, in 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 33. 
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on DOJ intervention may be biased. Even so, a convincing composite 
picture begins to emerge. DOJ makes intervention decisions strategically, 
in the sense that its decision calculus appears driven at least in part by 
factors separate and apart from consideration of pure merits, whether 
resource constraints, judicial threats to its ability to police collusive 
settlements, or the defendant’s identity. This suggests that judicial 
inferences linking DOJ decisions to case merit may be wrongheaded. 
D. Merits-Screening Versus Merits-Making and Partisan Political Control 
of DOJ: Quasi-Differences in Differences and Defense-Specific Analysis 
The empirical portrait presented thus far establishes that DOJ 
intervention decisionmaking is, at least in part, strategic in nature. But none 
of the results makes substantial headway on a pair of critically important 
questions. First, to what extent is DOJ a merits screener or a merits maker? 
Second, to what extent is DOJ gatekeeping, particularly its intervention 
decisionmaking, subject to partisan political control? As noted previously, 
these questions go to the core of debates about whether courts should draw 
merits inferences from DOJ intervention decisions and the extent to which 
private enforcement might serve an agency-forcing or anticapture role.130 
On the first question, disentangling DOJ’s merits-screening and 
merits-making ability is difficult because of a classic causal inference 
problem: DOJ intervention stands as both a selection mechanism and a 
treatment effect in ways that ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of 
recovery amounts on DOJ intervention cannot distinguish. Worse, DOJ 
intervention is endogenous with unobserved variables—namely, case 
merit—and will thus be correlated with the error term, risking inconsistent 
OLS estimates. A standard approach to work around such problems is 
instrumental variables estimation.131 By using an instrumental variable that 
separately (and exogenously) predicts DOJ intervention, one can derive an 
estimate of DOJ’s merits-making power that, when compared to an 
unadjusted measure of DOJ intervention on recoveries, yields an 
unconfounded estimate of DOJ’s merits-screening effect. The logit analysis 
presented previously contains a promising instrument: the Ninth Circuit’s 
Killingsworth decision strongly increased DOJ’s propensity to intervene in 
cases initiated within that circuit—presumably because of DOJ’s desire to 
preserve its absolute-settlement-veto rights—and yet should not have 
separately impacted the likelihood or size of an eventual recovery. 
However, results of a standard two-stage least squares (“2SLS”) analysis 
using Killingsworth as an instrument are heavily dependent on the choice 
 
130 See supra notes 16–18, 71–75 and accompanying text. 
131 See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN 
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 114, 131–33 (2009). 
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of dependent variable, with postestimation diagnostics suggesting a 
relatively weak instrument.132 
An alternative, but more tentative, identification strategy likewise 
exploits the Ninth Circuit’s Killingsworth decision and its apparent effect 
on DOJ’s propensity to intervene, this time by estimating the resulting 
impact on recovery size in intervened as against declined cases. The result 
is an estimation strategy that resembles a differences-in-differences 
approach. Suppose, for instance, that DOJ has an ability and desire to 
screen cases on the basis of expected value (i.e., the probability of a 
recovery times the recovery amount), thus creating a pool of relatively 
stronger intervened cases and a pool of relatively weaker declined cases. 
Killingsworth, by inducing DOJ to intervene in a tranche of cases it would 
not have taken previously, should thus yield a decline in average case value 
among intervened cases, as DOJ dips more deeply into the case pool and 
takes cases it would not have before.133 Interestingly, this should also 
reduce average case value in the declined pool, since a DOJ with merits-
screening capacity can be expected to select the higher-expected-value 
cases from the previously declined pool, for which collusive settlements 
impose the greatest cost. Further erosion of average case value in the 
declined pool may also result from a strategic response by relators: if DOJ 
is perceived to be more interventionist than before, then rational relators 
will file more and more marginal cases, since the expected value of any 
particular case—with that value a function, at least in part, of DOJ’s 
 
132 Using recovery dollars as the dependent variable, the Killingsworth instrument yields a strong 
and statistically significant coefficient at the first stage (p = 0.014) but a weak overall first-stage 
prediction of DOJ intervention (F-stat = 3.43, p = 0.016), well below the F-statistic of 10 that some see 
as a threshold requirement. Worse, the second-stage prediction of the impact of DOJ intervention on 
recovery dollars produces large standard errors (p = 0.819), yielding a highly imprecise estimate of 
DOJ’s merits-making power. By contrast, when a logarithmic transformation of recovery dollars (i.e., 
the log of 1-plus-the-recovery-amount, to account for zero recoveries) is substituted as the dependent 
variable, the 2SLS analysis performs far better, yielding a positive and strongly significant coefficient 
on government intervention at the second stage, implying that DOJ intervention has a substantial 
merits-making impact. Post-estimation diagnostics, including a Durbin and Wu-Hausman test, reject the 
null hypothesis that GOVTINTERVENED is exogenous, implying that 2SLS is preferable to OLS. But 
there is a problem: comparing the second-stage estimate of the effect of DOJ intervention to a simple 
(one-stage) OLS estimate of intervention’s effect on logged recovery-dollar amounts suggests that DOJ 
intervention, stripped of its merits-making effect, negatively impacts recovery size. In other words, DOJ 
merits screening reduces case value. This seems highly unlikely, suggesting that a weak instrument is 
biasing the results. 
133 A rational DOJ focused on maximizing total recoveries will intervene in additional cases post-
Killingsworth only until the marginal return on resources devoted to doing so equals the return on those 
resources if spent elsewhere. Put more concretely, additional interventions impose a cost on DOJ, 
reducing the resources it can put towards litigating cases already in the intervened pool. As a result, 
DOJ will intervene in additional cases only until the value of the prevented collusion equals the loss of 
case value due to the diminished resources available to litigate cases already in the intervened pool. 
Note that diminished resources available to litigate intervened cases should also further erode average 
case value within the intervened pool, strengthening the prediction of a negative quasi-differences-in-
differences estimator. 
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propensity to intervene—will be higher than before. The end result is no 
clear directional hypothesis, with a net effect on recovery amounts across 
intervened and declined cases before and after Killingsworth that could be 
positive, negative, or zero. 
Still, measuring Killingsworth’s impact in this way may permit 
recovery of an informative estimate. Indeed, apart from the likely decrease 
in average case value in the intervened pool, all of the remaining predicted 
impacts—the removal of the strongest cases from the declined pool and 
relator adjustment to a more interventionist DOJ—point to a positive net 
effect. Thus, a negative net effect on recovery size across intervened and 
declined cases before and after Killingsworth can be interpreted as a lower 
bound measure of DOJ’s ability to engage in merits screening of qui tam 
cases relative to a DOJ without any merits-screening capacity at all.134 
To derive estimates of Killingsworth’s net effect along these lines, I 
specify a regression model: 
 
yit = α + β1Xit + β2INTERVENi + β3τi + β4γi + β5(τi * INTERVENi) +  
β6(γi * INTERVENi) + β7(γi * τi) + β8(γi * τi * INTERVENi) + ei 
 
where y is recovery dollars in case i at time t, with t = {0,1} specifying the 
time period before (t = 0) and after (t = 1) Killingsworth, INTERVEN is an 
indicator variable equal to one if DOJ intervened in case i and zero 
otherwise, τ is an indicator variable equal to one if DOJ made its election 
decision after Killingsworth, γ is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
case falls within the Ninth Circuit, and Xit is a vector of other observable 
case characteristics. The main coefficient of interest is β8, which captures 
the “treatment” effect of DOJ intervention via a triple interaction term 
predicting recoveries in (i) intervened cases (ii) initiated within the Ninth 
Circuit (iii) after Killingsworth. 
To be sure, this identification strategy has shortcomings. It is not a true 
differences-in-differences approach, in that we are analyzing the treatment 
effect of DOJ decisions within a common pool of cases rather than, say, the 
effect of adopting a minimum wage law in a state compared to a state that 
did not adopt such a law.135 The approach does, however, retain at least 
 
134 Implicit in the above is the observation that changes in the intervention propensity of a DOJ 
without any capacity to accurately screen case merits but with a strong merits-making effect will not 
generate any net effect on recovery size in intervened as compared to declined cases, as DOJ’s 
decisions before and after any change in its intervention calculus will be random draws from the case 
pool. In particular, even if relators file more and more marginal cases in response to DOJ’s more 
interventionist stance, this should not impact the spread between the mean intervened recovery and the 
mean declined recovery, as DOJ’s allocation of the more marginal population of cases to the intervened 
and declined pools will remain random. 
135 In technical terms, we thus lack an exogenously determined group that is subject to treatment. In 
addition to this problem, estimating net effects across intervened and declined cases does not solve the 
endogeneity problem that an instrumental variables approach would: it remains the case that 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1740 
some of the advantages of differences in differences: by estimating what 
amounts to a pre-post, within-subjects difference of treatment and control 
groups, it controls for (i.e., “differences out”) unobserved features of the 
qui tam enforcement environment, such as changes in average case value 
over time, mitigating some of the concern about omitted variable bias. 
The approach also has the advantage of flexibility, as it can be used to 
explore other aspects of DOJ intervention decisionmaking, including the 
relationship between partisan political control of DOJ and qui tam litigation 
outcomes. Suppose, as some critics have claimed, that a Republican-
controlled DOJ has a “taste” for a less interventionist approach compared 
to a Democrat-controlled DOJ. A choosier Republican DOJ with the 
capacity to screen good and bad cases will thus intervene in stronger cases 
relative to its Democratic counterparts, resulting in higher average 
recoveries in intervened cases.136 But by taking fewer cases, a Republican 
DOJ with merits-screening capacity will also consign to the declined pool a 
tranche of cases that a Democratic DOJ would take, and these cases will 
tend to be stronger than the cases that previously made up the declined 
pool, increasing average case value. As with the Killingsworth example, 
relators may also adjust, this time filing fewer and stronger cases, further 
boosting average case value among declined cases. As before, the end 
result may be a net effect that is positive, negative, or zero, depending on 
the magnitude of the various effects. And yet, a positive net effect on 
average case value in intervened and declined case pools across a 
changeover from Democratic to Republican control can be interpreted as 
the result of a choosier DOJ with merits-screening capacity, as all other 
predicted effects—the relatively higher recovery value in the declined pool 
and a possible strategic response by relators—point to a negative net 
difference. 
As a final application of the differences-in-differences approach, 
consider a DOJ that, as some critics have contended, has a fully arbitrary 
“distaste” for defense-procurement cases—perhaps as part of an effort to 
deflect attention from politically unpopular war efforts. In contrast to the 
previous example, DOJ’s purely political refusal to take up defense-
procurement cases that would normally draw intervention will not affect 
average case value in the intervened pool, since those decisions are 
arbitrary from a merits (or expected-value) perspective. But arbitrary 
expulsions of cases from the intervened pool will boost average case value 
 
unobservable case merit affects both the probability of a recovery and DOJ’s decision to intervene, 
risking inconsistent OLS estimates. 
136 Cf. Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions, 
103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 534, 537 (2009) (using a similar approach to identify and estimate partisan bias 
in political corruption investigations and prosecutions). Intervening in fewer cases will also free up 
resources that can then be put toward the intervened cases that remain, further boosting average case 
value. 
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in the declined pool relative to the cases already there, as all cases in the 
previously intervened pool will be stronger than those in the declined pool. 
Following the same logic as above (including a possible strategic relator 
response), a negative net effect on average case value in intervened and 
declined defense-procurement cases across the Bush43 Administration and 
other administrations can thus be interpreted as evidence of politicized 
decisionmaking. 
Table 3 presents regression results using many of the same 
independent variables from before but with unlogged and logged inflation-
adjusted recovery dollar amounts (RECOVERYDOLLARS and 
LOGRECOVERYDOLLARS) as the dependent variables in Columns (A) and 
(B), respectively, and GOVTINTERVENED now included as an independent 
variable.137 New variables include: (i) CASECLOSEDYEAR, a time trend 
variable; (ii) indicator variables capturing whether a case drew a DOJ 
election decision during each of three presidential administrations 
(CASEELECTEDCLINTON, CASEELECTEDBUSH43, CASEELECTEDOBAMA) 
with Bush41 thus serving as the baseline category; and 
(iii) TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE, a triple interaction term of DEFENSE, 
CASEELECTEDBUSH43, and GOVTINTERVENED designed to gauge 
differences between the Bush43 and other administrations in defense cases. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables, as well as associated lower order 




137 As is customary when using logarithmic transformations to re-express variables, I take the log of 
inflation-adjusted recovery dollars plus $1 to account for losing (zero-dollar) cases. 
138 These include: (i) INTERVENDEFENSE, a variable interacting GOVTINTERVENED and DEFENSE; 
(ii) BUSH43DEFENSE, a variable interacting DEFENSE and CASEELECTEDBUSH43; 
(iii) INTERVENEDCLINTON, INTERVENEDBUSH43, INTERVENEDOBAMA, variables interacting each 
administration election variable with GOVTINTERVENED; and (iv) TRIPLEKILLINGSWORTH, 
INTERVENNINTHCIRCUIT, INTERVENKILLINGSWORTH, additional interaction terms for the triple-
differences Killingsworth analysis. 
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TABLE 3: OLS MODEL PREDICTING RECOVERY DOLLARS IN QUI TAM CASES, 1986–2011 
 (A) (B) 
TRIPLEKILLINGSWORTH -29.64** -1.921 
 (12.79) (1.374) 
INTERVENEDCLINTON 9.396 0.529 
 (11.58) (1.244) 
INTERVENEDBUSH43 11.08 0.397 
 (12.02) (1.292) 
INTERVENEDOBAMA 15.23 0.785 
 (12.34) (1.325) 
TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE -3.046 0.500 
 (6.904) (0.742) 
GOVTINTERVENED 8.368 11.17*** 
 (8.896) (0.956) 
DOJRESOURCECONSTRAINT -2.330 -0.712 
 (4.810) (0.517) 
EXPERIENCEDRELATOR 6.166*** -0.397** 
 (1.625) (0.175) 
TOPRELATORFIRM 4.242** 0.310 
 (2.029) (0.218) 
FORTUNE100 5.941** -0.381 
 (2.347) (0.252) 
DEFENSE50 0.496 0.870** 
 (3.194) (0.343) 
HEALTH 1.616 0.0167 
 (1.498) (0.161) 
DEFENSE -1.157 -0.217 
 (2.840) (0.305) 
INTERIOR 15.65*** -0.549 
 (4.993) (0.536) 
CASEFILEDYEAR -2.703*** -0.369*** 
 (0.358) (0.0384) 
CASECLOSEDYEAR 2.045*** 0.366*** 
 (0.334) (0.0359) 
Observations 3817 3817 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.666 
F-Stat (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is inflation-adjusted recovery in (A) and logged inflation-adjusted 
recovery plus $1 in (B). Standard errors are in parentheses. Lower order interaction terms 
(AFTERNINTH, NINTHCIRCUIT, INTERVENNINTHCIRCUIT, INTERVENKILLINGSWORTH, 
CASEELECTEDCLINTON, CASEELECTEDBUSH43, CASEELECTEDOBAMA, BUSH43DEFENSE, 
INTERVENDEFENSE) are omitted from presentation. Significance as follows: *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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As reflected in Table 3, regression analysis returned only a single 
statistically meaningful result among the five main coefficients of interest, 
and only in the unlogged version of the model. Specifically, the difference 
in the recovery between intervened and declined cases within the Ninth 
Circuit before versus after Killingsworth is roughly $29 million smaller 
than the difference before versus after Killingsworth in district courts 
outside the Ninth Circuit. To be sure, this result is hardly authoritative, 
especially given the lack of a significant result, even at the 90% confidence 
level, in the logged version of the model (i.e., Column (B)). Still, the 
analysis offers at least some empirical evidence that DOJ possesses merits-
screening capacity, contrary to claims that DOJ decisionmaking is wholly 
arbitrary. Indeed, a DOJ without the ability to sift more and less 
meritorious cases (but a greater post-Killingsworth propensity to intervene, 
as suggested by Table 2’s earlier regression analysis) would generate no 
change in average case value in intervened cases relative to declined cases 
in the Ninth Circuit before versus after Killingsworth compared to other 
cases. Rerunning the models with placebo versions of the Killingsworth-
related variables—moving the date of the Ninth Circuit’s decision forward 
or backward in time—suggests that the finding is robust.139 
 
139 Beyond placebo tests, we can also test the validity of the results of the Killingsworth analysis by 
examining the decision’s other effects within the system, including filing rates (to explore whether 
Killingsworth or DOJ’s response to it induced a strategic relator response) and recovery rates (to ensure 
that DOJ’s greater propensity to intervene translated into a comparably higher win rate as well). One 
way to test for a post-Killingsworth filing increase is a full-blown time-series model focused on filing 
rates (i.e., number of filings per capita in the Ninth Circuit before and after Killingsworth relative to 
cases outside the Ninth Circuit). A simpler way to gain at least some empirical purchase on the issue is 
a more modest descriptive comparison of filing trends, measured both in terms of filing counts and also 
as a proportion of total filings. A simple filing-count analysis, however, reveals little discernible 
difference inside and outside the Ninth Circuit, with filing trends roughly mirroring each other—e.g., 
increases during the mid- to late-1990s and a pronounced decline in the early- to mid-2000s. Results for 
filings measured as a proportion of total activity are more interesting: the Ninth Circuit’s proportion of 
filings jumped substantially in 1995 and 1996 in Killingsworth’s wake, from 18% in 1994 to 23% and 
then 26% in 1995 and 1996, respectively, then fell thereafter to a steady state of 14% to 20% for the 
remainder of the study period. This, then, would appear to support, if only weakly, the possibility of a 
strategic relator response immediately following Killingsworth. Measuring changes in DOJ’s post-
Killingsworth win rate can be accomplished in either of two ways. One is to use the same logit model as 
in Table 2, but substituting an indicator variable for whether each case produced a recovery, and 
omitting GOVTINTERVENED as a right-hand variable. However, given the tight coupling of DOJ 
intervention and the probability of a recovery, doing so will not tell us much. And indeed, the analysis 
returned results that are quite similar to Table 2’s logit analysis, implying a 14% greater likelihood of 
achieving a recovery after Killingsworth in cases within the Ninth Circuit, with the difference strongly 
statistically significant. An alternative is to use the same quasi-differences-in-differences approach 
deployed in Table 3 but replacing logged recovery amounts with an indicator variable capturing 
whether or not each case generated a recovery at all. Doing so returns a coefficient on the Killingsworth 
triple-interaction term implying a 4% decline in the probability of a recovery in intervened cases 
relative to declined cases before and after Killingsworth, but the result is not statistically significant. 
Neither of these analyses of recovery rates is contrary to expectation or otherwise raises red flags for the 
above account.  
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Turning to the question of possible partisan political control of DOJ, 
none of the three variables designed to test differences in outcomes across 
the Clinton, Bush43, and Obama Administrations, respectively, returned 
statistically significant coefficients. This suggests little or no relationship 
between overhead political control of DOJ and litigation outcomes across 
the run of qui tam cases. Rerunning the models across all case types with 
narrower bandwidth—e.g., running regressions on pairs of administrations, 
or constraining the sample to the final three years of an administration and 
the first three years of the next—likewise yielded no results that are 
statistically different from zero. 
While the variable TRIPLEBUSH43DEFENSE likewise did not yield a 
meaningful coefficient in Table 3’s regression model, suggesting the 
absence of any partisan dynamic in defense-procurement cases in 
particular, further analysis paints a more complicated portrait. First, 
rerunning the regression model constraining the sample to defense-only 
cases elected during the Bush43 and Obama Administrations finds a 
positive difference of $3.4 million in average recoveries across intervened 
and declined cases during the Obama Administration compared to 
intervened and declined cases during the Bush43 Administration, with the 
result statistically significant at the 90% level. Put another way, this offers 
weak evidence that the Obama DOJ did better in defense cases it joined 
compared to cases it declined than did the Bush43 DOJ. A more direct, 
pairwise comparison thus lends at least some credence to recent public 
statements of the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division 
implying that the Obama DOJ has been more aggressive and achieved 
greater success in defense cases than the Bush43 DOJ.140 
This does not exhaust analysis of partisan political dynamics in DOJ 
oversight, however. Recall that the critique of the Bush43 DOJ’s handling 
of defense-procurement cases is not just that DOJ was less likely to 
intervene in defense cases related to controversial war efforts, but also that 
DOJ affirmatively sat on such cases, avoiding case-election decisions 
altogether.141 If true, the result should have been a pool of relatively 
meritorious “holdover” cases on which DOJ deferred action during the 
Bush43 Administration and that the Obama DOJ then took up. This would 
help to explain the relatively higher mean recoveries since the beginning of 
 
As a final quality check, note that alternative regression approaches did not produce materially 
different results from those presented in Table 3. In particular, using a tobit (rather than OLS) model 
produced a similar result for the main Killingsworth interaction term, narrowly missing statistical 
significance at the 95% level in the unlogged version of the model. Alternatively, rerunning the 
regressions constraining the sample to winning cases only (that is, dropping cases for which the 
dependent variable was zero in Table 3’s models), weakens the significance of the Killingsworth result 
substantially, perhaps reflecting the smaller sample size, but is still consistent with theoretical 
expectation in terms of sign. Results of these further modeling efforts are available upon request. 
140 See Civil Division, supra note 19. 
141 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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the Obama Administration. But any systematic Bush43 DOJ practice of 
sitting on defense cases should also be directly observable in the form of 
longer investigation times—that is, the elapsed time between filing and a 
DOJ case-election decision—for defense cases taken up by the Obama DOJ 
compared to defense cases taken up by the Bush43 DOJ and all other case 
types during either administration. 
FIGURE 6: MEAN DOJ INVESTIGATION TIME BY CASE-ELECTION YEAR AND 















Figure 6 explores this possibility by plotting the mean number of days 
that cases were under DOJ investigation prior to a DOJ case-election 
decision over the period 1986–2011, in all cases and by case type (health, 
defense). As an initial matter, the line plots show that investigation times 
have risen steadily over the life of the regime. More arresting for our 
narrower purposes is the substantial recent variability of defense cases: 
investigation times in defense cases fell precipitously in 2007 at the tail end 
of the Bush43 Administration, then climbed to a historic peak in 2009 
during the first year of the Obama Administration, falling again thereafter. 
This combination of a steep decline as war efforts proceeded followed by a 
steep increase is consistent with a view that the Bush43 DOJ was quickly 
dispatching some defense-oriented cases and sitting on others, leaving the 
newly installed Obama DOJ with a large number of “holdover” cases on 
which the Bush43 DOJ had deferred decision. 
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TABLE 4: ATTRIBUTES OF QUI TAM DEFENSE-PROCUREMENT CASES DRAWING DOJ CASE-
ELECTION DECISIONS ACROSS THE BUSH43 AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS, 2007–2010 
 
Table 4 offers a still more granular analysis by presenting findings 
from a review of all 138 defense-procurement cases with and without a 
connection to war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan that drew a DOJ case-
election decision during the time window straddling the final two years of 
the Bush43 Administration and the first two years of the Obama 
Administration.142 None of the findings meet conventional levels of 
statistical significance—which is expected given sample-size limitations—
and so interpretation should proceed with caution.143 Still, several broad 
findings stand out. 
 
142 The analysis that follows excludes twenty-seven defense-related cases for which case file 
materials (and, in particular, complaints) were not available on PACER and could not otherwise be 
obtained. 
143 Table 4 reports simple t-tests across the shaded categories (“Bush43—All Defense Cases”; 
“Obama—All Defense Cases”). Joint F-tests of equalities performed on the nonshaded categories 
(Bush43 in war versus nonwar cases, Obama in war versus nonwar cases; Bush43 versus Obama in war 
cases; Bush43 versus Obama in nonwar cases) similarly found a lack of statistical significance at 
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57 708/595 14.0 26.3 $10.4 





(p = 0.170) 
1.2834 
(p = 0.20) 
-0.5515 
(p = 0.582) 
0.2555 
(p = 0.801) 
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First, even apart from the lack of statistical significance, certain 
measures reveal only small differences across administrations. Thus, 
defense cases that reached DOJ election decisions during the Bush43 and 
Obama Administrations within the four-year time window were under DOJ 
investigation for roughly comparable periods of time (a mean of 635 days 
versus 744 days, and a median of 582 versus 624 days). Similarly, 
successful defense-related cases (with or without a direct link to war 
efforts) across the two administrations during the time window produced 
roughly comparable recovery amounts (a mean of $15.9 million versus 
$13.6 million). 
Other measures, however, suggest wider cross-administration 
differences. As an initial matter, the Obama DOJ may have been choosier 
in defense cases than its predecessor, intervening roughly 15% of the time 
as against a 23% intervention rate during the Bush43 Administration. But 
even more striking are the differences across the two administrations in 
cases with and without a connection to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 
Breaking out cases in this way confirms that the pronounced uptick in 
investigation times for defense cases at the beginning of the Obama 
Administration was substantially driven by war-related cases, with war 
cases under investigation for an average of nearly 300 more days under 
Obama than Bush43 (827 days versus 538 days). And indeed, closer 
examination of the underlying cases reveals eleven war-related cases, all 
filed during the Bush43 Administration, that had been under investigation 
for more than 1000 days by the time the Obama DOJ reached a case-
election decision. Four of these eleven cases resulted in DOJ interventions, 
including a case which had been open for more than five years alleging that 
a military contractor had forged expiration dates in supplying food to 
military bases in Iraq.144 
The remaining measures further suggest potentially important 
differences across administrations. Thus, the Obama DOJ’s propensity to 
intervene appears consistent across cases with and without a war 
connection (16% versus 14%). But the Bush43 DOJ was nearly half as 
likely to intervene in cases with a war connection than in those without 
(roughly 13% versus 25%). Perhaps most arresting of all are the patterns in 
recovery amounts. War-related cases drawing DOJ election decisions 
during the Bush43 Administration have achieved far lower recoveries than 
cases without a war connection (approximately $4 million versus $17 
million). But during the Obama Administration, that relationship has 
flipped, with war-related cases yielding substantially larger recoveries ($24 
 
144 See Relator Delma Pallares’s First Amended Complaint at 11–15, United States ex rel. Pallares 
v. Itani, No. 4:05-cv-03018 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 2009); United States ex rel. Al-Sultan v. Pub. 
Warehousing Co., K.S.C., No. 1-05-cv-02968 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2013); United States ex rel. Brown v. 
APL Ltd., No. 3:04-cv-04424 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012); United States ex rel. Good v. Taylor, No. 5:08-
cv-00894 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2011). 
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million versus around $10 million). The result is that war-related cases that 
reached DOJ decisions under an Obama-controlled DOJ have generated 
substantially higher recoveries—roughly six times higher—than war-
related cases drawing case-election decisions under Bush43.145 
To be sure, there are alternative explanations for these defense-specific 
findings that cannot be ruled out. The most significant inferential threat is 
that the data suffer from a type of left-censoring problem: because war-
related cases could not by definition be initiated until the outbreak of 
hostilities, longer investigation times in cases drawing a DOJ decision 
during the Obama Administration might reflect nothing more than the fact 
that bigger, more complex cases take longer to investigate and so were 
more likely to be held over from the Bush43 Administration.146 Even apart 
from the lack of statistical significance, then, the analysis falls well short of 
a definitive test regarding partisan political influence. Put another way, 
while the data offer tentative evidence of a partisan political cast to DOJ 
oversight, the above analysis can neither confirm nor exclude that 
possibility, particularly the longstanding claim that the Bush43 DOJ 
disfavored or soft-pedaled war-related defense-procurement cases. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
In 1990, Senator Charles Grassley, the FCA’s most forceful champion 
and quarterback of the 1986 amendments, assailed DOJ for timid 
prosecution of fraud on the government during a congressional oversight 
hearing: “It has been said in another context that war is too important to 
leave to generals,” he intoned. “So too with antifraud efforts. They are too 
 
145 This pattern holds when considering per-case recoveries: Iraq/Afghanistan per-case recoveries 
are $4.0 million during Obama, compared to $0.5 million during Bush43, with nonwar recoveries 
during Obama substantially lower at $2.7 million, and nonwar recoveries during Bush43 substantially 
higher at $3.4 million. 
146 A second alternative explanation is that uncertainty as to whether the Iraq Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) was an instrumentality of the United States government within the meaning of the 
FCA delayed DOJ consideration of Iraq cases in particular. See United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. 
Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2009) (reversing district court’s dismissal on the 
basis that CPA was not a government instrumentality); Jessica C. Morris, Note, Civil Fraud Liability 
and Iraq Reconstruction: A Return to the False Claims Act’s War-Profiteering Roots?, 41 GA. L. REV. 
623, 635–46 (2007) (providing overview of CPA issue). But here the data offer a definitive response: 
dropping Iraq-related cases from the sample (and thus including only cases with or without a link to the 
Afghanistan war, including cases with links to both wars) does not materially alter and even strengthens 
the differences across the Bush43 and Obama Administrations. As just one example, the difference in 
time under investigation across Afghanistan-war-related cases widens relative to the difference in the 
sample that includes Iraq-related cases as well, with Bush43 cases under investigation for an average of 
269 days and Obama cases under investigation for 722 days. A more plausible alternative explanation is 
that DOJ waited to intervene in war-related cases until combat operations had wound down in both war 
efforts to avoid compromising the flow of needed supplies (e.g., a weapon system exclusively provided 
by a single company that, though not manufactured to contract specification, was nonetheless valuable 
to military operations). Unfortunately, the data do not speak to this possibility. 
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important to leave just to the Justice Department.”147 And yet Senator 
Grassley had only a few years before he presided over a legislative revival 
of the FCA that placed substantial power in DOJ’s hands to shape and 
control qui tam litigation. The goal of this Article—twenty years later and 
after repeated unanswered calls for empirical exploration of the FCA 
regime148—has been to provide the first systematic assessment of DOJ’s 
discharge of those statutory duties. The resulting findings have rich legal 
and policy implications, both for the FCA—now a $3 billion behemoth149—
and beyond.  
A. FCA Design Implications 
Looking first to the FCA, the above analysis confirms the 
longstanding criticism that DOJ too meekly deploys its authority to 
terminate qui tam cases out from under relators.150 On this score, Congress 
might consider ways to incentivize greater use of DOJ’s termination 
authority. Perhaps the most plausible proposal would seek to alter DOJ 
incentives by making DOJ jointly liable for attorney fee claims by 
prevailing defendants in declined cases.151 Similarly, Congress might 
consider amending the FCA to provide for a minimum recovery (at, say, 
$200,000), with DOJ paying the difference if a successful unintervened qui 
tam action recovers less.152 
Beyond this, my analysis rejects the claim made by some that DOJ 
intervention decisionmaking is random or that DOJ is solely a merits maker 
that arbitrarily places the enormous weight of the government behind cases 
and drives them to settlement. To the contrary, the evidence presented 
above suggests that DOJ has the capacity to screen cases on merits 
grounds, even at the margins. At the same time, however, my findings that 
DOJ intervention is also driven by a host of strategic and plainly non-
merits-based factors casts doubt on claims advanced by the FCA’s 
detractors that declined cases can and should be presumed meritless. 
These findings have two critical implications. First, the findings 
suggest that we should be concerned about the possibility that judicial 
deference to DOJ intervention decisions with only an imperfect connection 
to merits may be driving qui tam litigation outcomes.153 Simply put, forces 
 
147 False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and 
Governmental Relations, 101st Cong. 1, 2 (1990) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley). 
148 See, e.g., Kovacic, Monitoring Devices, supra note 16, at 1841–42, 1856–57 (noting limited 
nature of “[p]ublicly available data” on FCA regime and calling for “careful empirical assessment”); 
Elameto, supra note 16, at 835 (calling for “increased transparency” regarding DOJ decisionmaking). 
149 See Fraud Statistics, supra note 15 (noting 2012 qui tam recoveries of $3.35 billion). 
150 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
151 See Rich, supra note 16, at 1275. 
152 See Kwok, supra note 30, at 17. 
153 See supra note 17 (collecting cases suggesting judicial deference to DOJ decisions). 
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other than case merit contribute to DOJ intervention decisions; courts and 
commentators should stop assuming otherwise. 
Second, and for the same reason, the findings undercut proliferating 
calls to eliminate the qui tam mechanism entirely by precluding relators 
from going forward with cases in the absence of DOJ intervention. Doing 
so might make sense for those who seek to facilitate greater DOJ control 
over the direction and core purposes of the regime, or because the 
transaction costs consumed by losing cases outstrip any social welfare 
gains (a famously difficult calculation to make). But doing away with the 
qui tam mechanism is not warranted on the ground that declined cases 
necessarily lack objective indicia of merit. 
B. Beyond the FCA 
Stepping back and looking beyond the FCA, my analysis reveals a 
number of underappreciated challenges in the institutional design of 
litigation-oversight regimes. As noted previously, recent years have seen 
proliferating calls to export the FCA’s qui tam and agency-oversight 
mechanisms to regulatory arenas as diverse as civil rights, environmental 
protection, tax, and securities.154 It is the securities context that has seen the 
most frequent and vocal proposals. And it is also there that a qui tam-like 
enforcement and oversight mechanism is most likely: the recent Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created a simple 
cash-for-information whistleblower program that pays individuals for 
information leading to a successful SEC enforcement action but does not, 
in contrast to the FCA, grant them a private right of action to sue 
independently on the government’s behalf.155 But that could change: Dodd–
Frank also ordered the SEC’s Inspector General to conduct a study to 
determine whether that program should be built out into a full-on qui tam 
regime that vests whistleblowers who have already tried to pursue the case 
via the Commission with a private right of action.156 Published in early 
2013, the Office of Inspector General’s report did not rule out a qui tam 
 
154 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
155 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2010) (providing for awards of ten to thirty percent of total monetary 
sanctions collected to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide information to the Commission that leads 
to a successful enforcement action). In 2011, the SEC promulgated substantial regulations governing 
the bounty regimes. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 
34,368 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F). 
156 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6) (instructing the Inspector General to conduct a 
study of the whistleblower bounty regime, including “whether, in the interest of protecting investors 
and identifying and preventing fraud, it would be useful for Congress to consider empowering 
whistleblowers or other individuals, who have already attempted to pursue the case through the 
Commission, to have a private right of action to bring suit based on the facts of the same case, on behalf 
of the Government and themselves, against persons who have committed securities fraud”). 
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approach, noting the need for further study.157 Importantly, Congress’s 
possible interest in bringing qui tam to Dodd–Frank may be a bellwether: 
in an era of deepening fiscal austerity, private enforcement should be an 
increasingly attractive alternative to traditional—and on-budget—
regulatory mechanisms.158 
To be sure, the applicability of my findings to securities or other 
regulatory areas must confront the usual questions of generalizability. And 
it is important to concede that the advisability of agency oversight 
elsewhere in the American regulatory state will be heavily context 
dependent. It is also relevant that the FCA is, in a number of key respects, 
unusual or even sui generis in its structure and subject matter. FCA cases 
are famously complex compared to, say, employment discrimination cases 
because of their intersection with dense Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement regulations or the notoriously complex Federal Acquisition 
Regulations. FCA lawsuits are also quite different from other private 
enforcement regimes, such as securities or antitrust, in that the government 
has unique access to information about FCA case merits, making DOJ a 
potentially more reliable evaluator and signaler of case merits.159 One 
should therefore be cautious about generalizing the above findings to other 
contexts. 
Even so, the findings presented above suggest some broad lessons that 
can and should guide regulatory architects in the design of litigation-
oversight regimes while also pointing to potentially fruitful avenues for 
future research. First, it is noteworthy that many existing calls for expanded 
agency oversight of private litigation focus on the ability of agency 
gatekeepers to terminate undesirable enforcement efforts.160 Yet the theory 
and evidence presented above suggest that this is the task that a rational 
agency, buffeted by political winds, is least likely to pursue.161 To the 
extent policymakers hope that the SEC, for instance, could play a 
substantial gatekeeper role by ensuring that certain securities class actions 
never get off the ground, they should consider building in direct incentives 
 
157 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM vi (2013), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/
2013/511.pdf (“Upon collecting additional data and assessing the effectiveness of the program after a 
reasonable amount of time has passed, OIG will be in a better position to opine on the usefulness of 
adding a private right of action to the SEC’s whistleblower program.”). 
158 See BURKE, supra note 1, at 179 (hypothesizing that budgetary constraints may fuel a shift from 
public to private enforcement); David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, 
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 
2015) (noting possible effect of fiscal conditions on legislative creation of bounty regimes); Sean 
Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System, 
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 827 (2008) (detailing a “budget constraint hypothesis” for rising use of private 
litigation as a regulatory tool). 
159 See Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 48. 
160 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 6, at 1354.  
161 See Engstrom, Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 58–59 (making this point).  
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in order to induce the agency to carry out desired levels of case 
termination. The best way to do so, as noted previously, may be to hold the 
agency liable for a prevailing defendant’s fees or costs in declined cases or 
establish a minimum recovery and put the agency on the hook for any 
shortfall.162 
A second broad lesson concerns the challenge of designing litigation-
oversight structures that promote the optimal mix of politically insulated 
expertise and bureaucratic autonomy on the one hand and democratic 
accountability on the other—an issue that echoes across theories of 
regulation and administrative law.163 Consider as an example the FCA’s 
tiered bounty system, whereby relators receive a higher proportion of 
recoveries in declined cases. As noted previously, this structure was 
initially designed as an agency-forcing measure to incentivize relators to go 
it alone in the face of a bureaucracy unable or unwilling to enforce. But the 
foregoing analysis suggests that tiered bounties create strong disincentives 
for DOJ to fully delegate enforcement authority to capable and well-
resourced private enforcers. This will be particularly true in large cases 
because tiering raises the opportunity cost and, from the perspective of a 
DOJ with rent-seeker tendencies, the “price” of full delegation. 
To be sure, weighing the welfare gains of tiering’s agency-forcing or 
anticapture effect against the welfare losses from suboptimal delegation of 
enforcement authority to private enforcers is difficult. Even so, it is not 
hard to see that tiering, initially crafted to incentivize relators to litigate 
cases opposed by a risk-averse or captured bureaucracy, may instead 
confound efficient management of private enforcement capacity by making 
gatekeeper agencies less likely to rely on competent private enforcers. 
Further research should model the likely consequences of eliminating tiered 
recoveries, both on an agency’s oversight proclivities as well as the 
willingness of private enforcers to initiate enforcement efforts in the first 
place. 
A third insight—and a third possible design lesson—concerns the 
optimal degree of transparency within litigation oversight regimes, an issue 
that once more implicates classic trade-offs among core administrative-
design values, particularly bureaucratic expertise/autonomy and political 
accountability. Consider in this vein a recent bill in Congress designed to 
increase the transparency of the FCA’s qui tam regime by imposing 
heightened case-level reporting requirements on DOJ.164 In some ways, the 
bill’s main provisions should strike experienced litigators as nonsensical, as 
it would have required DOJ to report the “actual” amount of fraud, 
apparently so that congressional overseers can measure the falloff in the 
 
162 See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.  
163 See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).  
164 Fighting Fraud to Protect Taxpayers Act of 2011, S. 890, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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ultimate settlement or judgment.165 In other ways, however, transparency 
proposals promise a welcome improvement over the current situation, 
providing much-needed information about the basic contours of a critically 
important litigation regime that has, until now at least, remained largely 
opaque to the public and legislative overseers alike. 
And yet, my analysis also suggests that greater transparency might be 
a double-edged sword. It is possible, for instance, that efforts to improve 
transparency may be self-defeating because they will exacerbate agency 
pursuit of political rewards.166 Simply put, a gatekeeper agency subject to 
pervasive political oversight may be more likely to privilege observable 
bureaucratic outputs, such as public recoveries or win–loss ratios, over 
other, potentially more public-interested tasks, such as minimizing costly 
meritless litigation by terminating cases.167 Here, the above-noted reform 
measures that more directly impact DOJ incentives—such as holding DOJ 
liable for defendant fees and costs in declined cases that do not generate 
recoveries or, alternatively, any shortfall below a statutorily set minimum 
recovery—may prove the better reform avenue.168 
Finally, and more broadly, my analysis suggests the need to revitalize 
and reorient scholarly debate around regulatory design and the optimal 
structure of law enforcement. Much of the existing theoretical literature 
treats public and private enforcement as pure substitutes and a binary 
choice in which a government that seeks to regulate undesirable behavior 
chooses between purely public and purely private enforcement or specifies 
a strict division of labor between the two.169 Yet all the while, many of our 
most consequential regulatory regimes have evolved into hybrids of public 
and private enforcement in which multiple enforcers—including federal 
and state administrative agencies, private litigants, and state attorneys 
general—operate and interact within complex “ecologies of 
enforcement.”170 The institutional-design challenge in the present regulatory 
 
165 Id. at 14–18.  
166 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting concern that agencies with gatekeeper powers 
will pursue political rewards rather than the public interest); see also Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 
37, at 40 (arguing that increased transparency may exacerbate agency vulnerability to “accountability 
pathologies”). For a more technical working out of similar ideas, see Andrea Prat, The Wrong Kind of 
Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862 (2005); and Justin Fox, Government Transparency and 
Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23 (2007).  
167 See supra notes 34–43.  
168 See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.  
169 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 9. Classic contributions in this line of inquiry include Gary S. 
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, supra note 24; and Polinsky, supra note 24.  
170 See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 7. A number of legal scholars have remarked on the evolution of 
multienforcer regimes and have begun to explore the various political, social, and economic forces that 
have fueled their emergence. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1; FARHANG, supra note 1; Margaret H. 
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 486 (2012); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 
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landscape is not just determining whether public or private enforcement 
should be given primary or exclusive domain labor, but also how to 
structure institutions—or combinations of institutions—that can optimally 
coordinate multiple, overlapping, and interdependent enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Going forward, two types of inquiry are in order, one theoretical and 
the other empirical. On the theoretical side, we need better theories for 
understanding what the ideal public enforcer role should be in a world of 
coordinated public–private enforcement. By extension, we need better 
models to understand how particular institutional designs—including the 
FCA as well as a range of competing design proposals—might best 
facilitate desired public management of available private enforcement 
capacity. On the empirical side, we need more micro-institutional analyses 
that can help us gauge how agency oversight works, or does not work, and 
when it is likely to deviate from Part I’s gatekeeper ideal.171 This Article 
hopefully takes a small step in both directions. 
  
 
(2011); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical 
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010). Others have noted the increasingly blurred line between 
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